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In conclusion, we would express our apprehensions that the inevitable
tendency of the present repressive measures of the Porte will be to revive
Mohammedan hostility to Christianity throughout this Welaiet,1 to
rekindle fires that may not be easily extinguished, to reverse the liberal
and clement policy of the Sultan Abdul Mejid, who declared all Ottoman
subjects to be equal before the law; to gradually extinguish, if persisted in,
the only means of education and enlightenment open to the Christians of
Syria and Palestine; and, finally, by encouraging Mohammedan hatred to
Christian churches and schools, to rouse a spirit which would soon
become uncontrollable, and end in a repetition of the scenes of 1860.2
Rev. Henry Harris Jessup D.D., American Presbyterian missionary to Syria3 from
1856 to 1910, composed this statement in 1885-1886 as a response to what he called
“certain difficulties connected with the prosecution of Christian education, missionary
and benevolent work” in “the Welaiet of Syria, including Palestine, east and west of the
Jordan.”4  He was addressing the “representatives of the Christian powers at the Sublime
Porte. . . [and] the Christian public” as the current Secretary of the Syria mission.5
                                                 
1 An Ottoman administrative district, similar to a province.
2 Henry Harris Jessup, Memorial of Missionaries in Syria and Palestine with Regard to Churches, Schools,
&c. (London: Spottiswoode & co., 1886), 12.
3 For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term Syria as the Board of Foreign Missions of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States, and previous to 1870, the American Board of Commissioners for
Foreign Missions used the term.  For these missionaries, Syria described a region that today makes up
much of the nations of Syria and Lebanon, or what is often referred to as Bilad al-Sham.  This paper’s use
of Syria, then, does not correspond to greater Syria, which encompasses modern day Syria, Lebanon, Israel,
Palestine, Jordan, parts of southeastern Turkey, and perhaps part of the Sinai Peninsula.  The center of the
mission was always in Beirut.  This conception follows Fruma Zachs excellent work on the American
missionaries’ invention of the term Syria based on their Biblical conceptions, which was then appropriated
by Arab Christian intellectuals like Butrus al-Bustani.  Fruma Zachs, “Toward a Proto-Nationalist Concept
of Syria? Revisiting the American Presbyterian Missionaries in the Nineteenth-Century Levant,” Die Welt
des Islams 41, no. 2 (July 2001): 145-173.
4 Jessup, Memorial of Missionaries, 3.
5 Ibid., 3. The Sublime Porte refers to the Ottoman central authority in Istanbul under the Sultan.  Jessup
used the term “Christian public” here in an attempt to broaden the scope of his appeal, although in reality
his audience would have been Protestants in the English-speaking world.  Jessup’s audience and choice of
words will be discussed at length in chapter four.
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In the March 1886 publication of the missionary periodical, The Foreign
Missionary, Jessup again stated his case, this time to the readers in North America and
Europe:
Meanwhile the Government is aiding in the repair of old mosques, and the
building of new ones, which need no firmans.6  The taxes paid by
Christians are used toward building Moslem mosques.  The late Walz
[Waly]7 of Syria declared that as soon as the Moslem youth could be
educated in the Reshdiya8 school, he would turn out every Christian
government employe [e] in Syria.  Formerly there was nothing of this
hostility.  All sects were allowed to build houses of worship without
molestation.  Now everything bearing the Christian name seems to be
under the ban.9
These statements exemplify the focus of this paper: what did American Protestant
missionaries to Syria in the late nineteenth century think about Islam and the Ottoman
government; and as a corollary to this question, were these perceptions necessarily
related?  How much should these missionaries be categorized as Islamophobic
polemicists10 interested only in the furtherance of their belief system and the ridicule of
others?  In other words, can Henry Jessup be compared with what Ryan Dunch has
                                                 
6 An official Ottoman edict.
7 A governor.
8 Ottoman schools between the primary, or sibyan schools, and the higher levels of Idadiya, Sultaniya, or
Madrasa.  For more information about the Ottoman educational system, see Selçuk Aksin Somel, The
Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and
Discipline (Leiden: Brill, 2001), which provides an in-depth discussion of the development of Ottoman
state education.
9 The Foreign Missionary, Volume XLIV, (New York: Mission House, 1842-1886), March 1886.
Emphasis is my own.
10 My definition of polemical, as taken from the Oxford English Dictionary is as follows: “a controversial
argument; a strong verbal or written attack on a person, opinion, doctrine, etc.; (as a mass noun) writing or
opinion of this kind.  Also: (in sing. and pl.) aggressive debate or controversy; the practice of engaging in
such a debate.”  A secondary definition is: “a polemical argument—a diatribe.”  Related to this is the
definition of a polemicist: “a person who argues or writes in opposition to another, or who takes up a
controversial position; a controversialist.”  Jessup’s writing, especially that surrounding the 1885 school
controversy (to be explained below), has often been seen as an example “polemical” missionary writing in
the sense of writing that is purposefully combative and aggressive.  Rather, this paper will argue that
Jessup’s writing surrounding the 1885 controversy should more accurately be described as rhetorical.  My
definition of rhetorical, again from the OED, is as follows: “the art of using language so as to persuade or
influence others” or “speech or writing expressed in terms calculated to persuade.”
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termed the “popular image of the finger-wagging missionary condemning a host culture
wholesale and seeking to replace it in its entirety”?11  Through a study of missionary
documents with a specific focus on Henry Jessup’s writing surrounding the controversy
of the 1880s described above, Jessup’s discourse will be contextualized to argue against
the interpretation that views it as polemics about Islam and the Ottoman government
based on Orientalist foundations.  This is not to suggest that Jessup and other
missionaries did not perpetuate certain Western stereotypes about the Ottoman and
Muslim world, as they clearly did with their continued use of inherently prejudicial and
incorrect terminology such as “Mohammedan” and “Turk.”  Even so, the larger issues
that Jessup addresses concerning the controversy in the 1880s with the Ottoman
government demonstrate that his writing was rhetorical and crafted to uphold the work of
the mission amidst an acute climate of opposition and a larger context of educational
competition.
Henry Jessup’s views of Islam, and his overall “zealous” attitude, have been the
subject of many scholars’ interest (or perhaps even ire).12  Not only are Jessup and
                                                 
11 Ryan Dunch, “Beyond Cultural imperialism: Cultural Theory, Christian missions, and Global
modernity,” History and Theory  41, no. 3 (October 2002), 322.
12 For example, A.L. Tibawi, who might be called the authority on Jessup and the American mission to
Syria, asserts that “he did not conceal his hatred of Islam”.  A.L. Tibawi, American Interests in Syria, 1800-
1901: A Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Works (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966), 269.
Elsewhere, on page 256, he argues that Jessup “never concealed his contempt for ‘nominal’ Christians, his
hostility to the Ottoman system, or his hatred of Islam.”  Edward Said references Jessup as a missionary
who was a part of the “imperial constellation facilitating Euro-American penetration of the Orient.”
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 294.  Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh dubs Jessup a
“diehard missionary polemicist” who “persisted in maintaining a bitter vendetta against the Muslim religion
for many decades.”  Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh, American Missions in Syria (Brattleboro, Vermont, Amana
Books, inc., 1990), 47.  Samir Khalaf, who does at least use more of Jessup’s publications, although he
neglects to look at any archival or unpublished work by Jessup, judges Jessup as a missionary who “refused
to discard or even temper his defamatory images of the Levant or his arrogant evangelistic perspectives.”
Samir Khalaf, Cultural Resistance: Global and Local Encounters in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books,
2001), 35.  Khalaf also sees Jessup as “exemplary and perhaps unrivalled” in his perpetuation of
medievalist stereotypes about Islam and the Orient.  Khalaf, 162.  Jens Hanssen, one of the more recent
scholars to address Jessup in his Fin de Siecle Beirut, only uses material from his memoir 53 Years in Syria
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American missionaries like him portrayed as Orientalists,13 but they are also seen as
having an even more bigoted view of Islam based on their strong religious beliefs.
However, scholars have yet to look at this Presbyterian missionary in an in-depth,
longitudinal, or contextualized enough fashion to do justice to his work as a missionary.14
Because he is so often held up as the prototype of American Missionaries to the Ottoman
Empire,15 or to Muslims in general, it is essential to reevaluate his role and legacy,
especially in light of recent scholarship on the Ottoman Empire under Abdul Hamid II.
American missionaries have often been a part of scholarly debates concerning the
last century of the Ottoman Empire.  The wealth of documents left behind by these
missionaries and the unique role that they played as Westerners in long-lasting and
intimate relationships with the “other” in the Ottoman world has placed them in the
crosshairs of such larger questions as the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of the
millet system,16 the origins of Arab nationalism, modernization theory in the Middle East,
                                                                                                                                                  
and highlights him as “even more outspoken” in his Orientalism, bigotry, and superiority than fellow
missionary Daniel Bliss, who Hanssen already tagged as someone who saw “backwardness and fanaticism .
. . [as] innately Oriental qualities.”  Jens Hanssen, Fin de Siecle Beirut (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005),
184-185.
13 Khalaf, 105-125.
14 A.L. Tibawi is really the only scholar who has looked at Henry Jessup in detail and taken into account
the large volume of primary sources available; however, I hope to nuance his work with the aid of research
done in the years after the publication of his work in 1966.  Based on the wealth of materials on Jessup and
the Presbyterian Mission to Syria in general, there is certainly enough information that this project could be
extended into a dissertation in the future.
15 For example, Kenneth Cragg called Henry Jessup the “doyen of the American Presbyterian Mission.”
Kenneth Cragg, The Arab Christian: A History in the Middle East (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John
Knox Press, 1991), 135.  Robert Haddad quotes from Jessup’s The Greek Church and Protestant Missions
(1891) and suggests that Jessup “spoke the sentiments of two generations of Presbyterian toilers in the
Syrian vineyard.” Robert M. Haddad, Syrian Christians in Muslim Society: An Interpretation (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1970), 80.  Edward Said solely references Jessup’s memoir 53 Years in Syria
for his discussion of American missions to the Arab world in the nineteenth century.  Said, 294.  Samir
Khalaf uses Henry Jessup, “a quintessential Protestant Orientalist,” for his discussion of missionary reports
being read back in the United States and contributing to American Protestant images of Islam because his
“life and thoughts. . . stand out as a paramount example.”  Khalaf, 162, 152.
16 The term for the Ottoman administrative system governing religious minority groups in the Ottoman
Empire in the nineteenth century.  Each community had its own hierarchy that controlled civil affairs for
the community, collected taxes, and represented the community to the Ottoman government.  For more on
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the impact of the Capitulations,17 and the nature of imperialism/colonialism, to name only
a few.  While certainly at times the role of missionaries has been overblown, recent
scholarship continues to assert their importance as a source and a center of cross-cultural
interaction for studies of the last century of the Ottoman Empire.18
As more documents are made available in Ottoman archives and elsewhere, more
and more excellent scholarly works are being produced that shed light on the American
missionary experience in the last century of the Ottoman Empire.  These works, that are
able to take into account documents in Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Turkish, Armenian, as
well as Western languages, portray the setting in which Rev. Jessup and many others like
him worked, under Sultan Abdul Hamid II (beginning in 1876), as increasingly
contentious.19  As the Ottoman centralization program grew especially beginning in the
late 1870s, competition among those groups or individuals who had influence over the
populace also grew.  Among these figures are the Ottoman central and local authorities,
the religious hierarchies of the various minority groups of the Empire, the foreign powers
(especially France, Britain, and Russia, but also the United States), the ulama (both
traditional and modernist religious scholars), and missionaries (even among different
                                                                                                                                                  
this issue see, Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System,” in Christians and Jews in the
Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Volume II: The Arabic Speaking Lands, ed.
Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meir Publishers 1982), 69-88.
17 The Ottoman system governing foreign trade within the Empire.  European nations were given certain
trading privileges and rights of extra-territoriality.  European merchants then sought to extend these
privileges to local protégés (non-Muslims) in order to further commercial interests.  Certain nations formed
long-standing connections with certain local minority groups, such as the French with the Maronites.
18 Many works could be mentioned, but two that should certainly be pointed out as examples are Jens
Hanssen’s Fin de Siecle Beirut: The making of an ottoman Provincial Capital (2005) and Benjamin Fortna,
Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire  (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
19 In addition to the already mentioned works by Hanssen and Fortna, see Selim Deringil, The Well-
Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London:
IB Tauris,1998) and Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-
1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) emphasize Hamidian policy against foreign, and
particularly, missionary influence.
6
missionary groups).  Syria-Lebanon was a particular area of interest to all parties
concerned because of its diverse makeup, chaotic recent history, and reputation as a
(relatively) liberal center of education and the press.20
This new scholarship also agrees that the Ottoman authorities were specifically
aware of what they perceived to be the very negative impact of American Protestant, as
well as other Christian, missionary work in the Empire.  These Ottoman authorities, both
from Istanbul and from local administrations,21 sought to implement their anti-foreign
program especially in the coastal area of Syria including Beirut because it had historically
been a region of heavy foreign influence, communal conflict, suspect loyalty to Istanbul,
and a location that had the ability to influence other parts of the Empire through its press
establishment.  Quite literally, the Ottoman government and Henry Jessup, as leader of
the American mission in Syria, squared off into what would often be a rhetorical battle,
although it also had concrete results, for influence over the Ottoman populace in Syria-
Lebanon.22
The field in which this hostility was most clearly present was that of education
because it was the primary means through which American missionaries sought to
influence those with whom they interacted, including members of various religious
groups in Syria-Lebanon.  Having largely abandoned direct proselytism with Muslim
groups certainly by the 1840s, the American mission had gradually shifted its focus
                                                 
20 See for example Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 55-64.
21 This paper seeks to add to the already significant work done on the late Ottoman Empire concerning the
question of the relationship of center (Istanbul) to periphery (such as the Arab Provinces, including Syria).
For example, see Hasan Kayali’s Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the
Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
22 This paper will focus on missionary activity in greater Syria, although this same argument has been and
could be made for other regions of the Empire.  See Rogan’s Frontiers of the Empire (1999).
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towards education as the most effective means of influence.23  Especially in the 1860s
and 1870s, American mission schools multiplied.  Their reputation for “modern”
schooling including Western languages brought demand from the local population.
Schools, conducted often in houses (those owned by sympathetic local Syrians), had also
conveniently been a field of influence that was relatively safe and possible to develop
under Ottoman rule, as compared with church-building for example.
However, the Ottoman authorities, especially through the use of the school reform
law of 1869,24 also hoped to use schools as a means by which to inculcate Ottoman ideals
and loyalty to the Sultan and Empire.  The Ottoman authorities saw this missionary
influence in education as a direct and worrisome threat to their rule.  The Ottomans
worried especially about possible missionary influence over Muslims of the Empire, but
also about the disrupting effect that missionary education might have on the delicate
millet system governing the religious minorities of the Empire.  This threat carried far
beyond the field of religion though, as the Hamidian regime increasingly sought to use
Islam for political legitimacy, which was engendered in schools, even while they hoped
to maintain the support of the various millets in the Empire.
Beginning in 1885, the American mission to Syria, under the leadership of Henry
Jessup, faced the most direct challenge to its education-based program of missions in the
history of the roughly sixty five year old mission: the forcible closing of mission schools
in different parts of Syria.  While Jessup complained about Islam and Ottoman rule many
times previous to 1885, these complaints were always less pronounced than those
                                                 
23 Tibawi, American Interests, 143.
24 The ramifications of this law will be discussed later in the paper; but in short, the 1869 law (inspired by a
French program) set apart public and private schools, made primary education free and compulsory for all
Ottoman subjects, and called for the development of higher schools in larger towns and cities.  Tibawi,
American Interests, 257.
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concerning internal debates within the mission, the competition of other foreign schools,
and the difficulty of carrying out their work with the local Eastern Christian population.
By the 1880s however, the mission had grown large enough in size and influence to both
be recognized by the Ottomans as a serious threat and for the missionaries to have
developed a firmer sense of their supposed rights as a mission.  Furthermore, schools had
become the central focus of the Presbyterian American mission’s program.  All of these
elements combined under the already broader tense atmosphere of the Hamidian Empire
to mark the school closings beginning in 1885 as a watershed in the history of the
Presbyterian mission to Syria.  Due to the change of 1885, Jessup’s rhetoric shifted, and
Islam and the Ottoman authorities were now jointly blamed for persecution against the
mission.  Finally, from 1885 until World War I and the end of the Ottoman Empire, the
Presbyterian mission’s work became increasingly secular as a response to what ultimately
was a successful assertion of authority and centralization from the Ottoman government.
In sum, Jessup’s language against Islam surrounding the school closings in 1885
and following should be seen in the context of the growing purposeful conflation of the
religious with the political, the Caliph with the Sultan, which the Ottoman authorities
hoped would bolster their authority throughout the Empire.  A closer reading of the
sources of the period and a broader understanding of the context surrounding these
missionaries demonstrates that American Protestant missionaries in the last sixty years of
the Empire were participating in a competition for influence in which they were just as
“guilty” as the authorities governing the region in which they worked.  The Ottomans
were indeed the sovereign political authority in Syria who desired to maintain peace
among the various religious groups in the Empire, but the conflict of the 1880s was a
9
unique situation where the Ottomans attempted to assert a new, centralized, control over
Syria to which many people in Syria besides the American missionaries reacted.  Jessup
did not show deference to Ottoman impositions in Syria in the 1880s; rather he
challenged the Ottomans’ claim for influence in Syria based on his understanding of the
crucial role (for himself, for the mission overall, and for the people of Syria—Christians
and Muslims) of the American mission there.  Without placing blame on either side, a
picture emerges of a conflict between two sides that believed deeply in what they were
doing and were willing to use any means available to them to support their cause.
Significance
This paper offers a contribution to multiple fields of historical study—both
regional and topical.  It also contributes especially to the history of missions and the
history of the late Ottoman Empire but also, and at the same time, to imperial/colonial
and religious history.
In the field of missions history, this paper first and foremost follows the model
laid out by Ussama Makdisi, Ryan Dunch, and Fruma Zachs that moves beyond the past
controversy concerning the relationship of missionaries to imperialism/colonialism.
Instead a missions history that recognizes the complexity of the interplay of various
forces at work on and from both the missionaries and the indigenous culture will be
portrayed.  This process will be described through contextualization of missionaries,
descriptions of change over time, and evaluations of certain local reactions to
missionaries.
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Secondly, the paper adds to the work of scholars such as Jens Hanssen, Eugene
Rogan, Bruce Masters,25 Benjamin Fortna, Selim Deringil, and Ussama Makdisi, who
have all demonstrated the utility of studying missionaries in order to understand the late
Ottoman Empire, and especially greater Syria.  Missionaries, who usually spoke the
colloquial dialect and lived for years among the local people not just in ports or capitals
but also in rural areas, were in the unique position to comment on a changing society in
late Ottoman Syria.  Deringil even argues that Hamidian actions in the provinces to foster
an official state connection with Hanafi Islam26 were “perhaps best understood for what
they were by the missionaries.”27
Thirdly, by contextualizing missionary rhetoric, the culpability of missionaries in
the Orientalist enterprise is to a certain extent diminished.  Certainly, missionaries often
espoused bigoted and ethnocentric viewpoints and engaged in polemics, but by focusing
the study on one individual missionary in a specific context, Henry Jessup can no longer
be seen as a classic example of what Dunch has dubbed the “narrow-minded chauvinist
whose presence and preaching destroyed indigenous cultures and opened the way for the
extension of colonial rule.”28  If nothing else, the focused reading of one missionary’s
documents calls into question the view that suggests that all missionaries to the Middle
East or anywhere else were all the same across time.
                                                 
25 As this author’s work has not been referenced as of yet: Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the
Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
26 Hanafi refers to one of the four Sunni schools of law.  Each school, or madhab, extends back to a line of
teachings from the medieval period in Islam and are accepted by all Sunnis as legitimate, if not necessarily
preferable.  The schools correspond largely to regional designations, but the official Ottoman school was




More specifically, this study calls into question the prevailing view of Henry
Jessup as the “legendary” and “ubiquitous” example of the American missionary to Syria
in the late nineteenth century who remained a “diehard missionary polemicist”
throughout his fifty-three years as a missionary.29  Through the means of an in-depth
reading of Jessup’s wealth of writing, over a length of time, and in specific historical
circumstances, Jessup is historicized to fit Zachs’ model: “every missionary was a world
of himself, with his own character and understanding and should be examined as such.”30
Fourthly, the great distance between the ideals of the beginnings of the Second
Great Awakening in the early nineteenth century and what this had become in practice by
the late nineteenth century demonstrates the transformation of missions between ideals
and practice.  When the American Board of Foreign Missions first turned its focus to
mission in the Ottoman Empire in 1810s, the intentions were actually to proselytize
among Jews and Muslims near Jerusalem with a wider millenarian conception of the
purpose of their work.  By the 1880s the practice of the Syria mission (which had been
transferred to the control of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in
1870) had become educational work with Eastern Christians near Beirut.  When
missionaries were actually working on the ground in Syria, missionary work was often
much different from the official program of the mission board back in the United States,
and this is demonstrated throughout the history of the mission.  This also fulfills the
prescription of recent missiology theory that stresses the malleability of mission work as
it was put into practice and negotiated with the local society.  The mission, in other
                                                 
29 Said, 293-294.  Abu-Ghazaleh, 47.
30 Fruma Zachs, “From the Mission to the Missionary: The Bliss Family and the Syrian Protestant College
(1866-1920),” Die Welt des Islams 45, no. 2 (2005): 290.
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words, has a specific history of its own that sheds light on missionary practice in Syria in
the later nineteenth century.
In the regional history of the late Ottoman Empire, the paper also illuminates
multiple issues.  First, it contributes to the already voluminous studies available
concerning the question of the influence of missionaries on Westernization and
modernization in the late Ottoman Empire, even though it does not focus on these issues.
More specifically, this includes such issues as the growth of nationalism among different
groups in the Ottoman Empire and the question of the nahda or Arab awakening that
George Antonius’ work made so famous.31  While this debate is not directly addressed,
this study’s stress on the pervasiveness and importance of American educational missions
(in the minds of the missionaries, Ottomans, and locals) as well as its focus on the
complex situation of educational competition complicates this question in order to
suggest that the answer may not be found in either/or conclusions.
This paper also adds to the recent studies of the centralization and political
consolidation policies of Abdul Hamid II.  A central tenet of these policies was an
improvement of the Ottoman state educational system that attempted to supplant
American and other Christian missions influence while at the same time using them as a
model for improvement.  The Hamidian policy against foreign missionary schools also
sheds light on the question of Ottomanism versus Pan-Islamism under Abdul Hamid II.
The Ottoman government was interested in using both models for political control as
much as possible.  The Ottomans were not only concerned about the possible missionary
impact on Muslims and heterodox Muslims (including the Druzes and the Nusairis-
                                                 
31 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (London: H.
Hamilton, 1938).
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Alawis) but also on various Christian millet groups within the Empire.32  The Ottomans
were worried about the missionary impact on the Christian groups of the Empire for two
main reasons: an economic loss due to missionary education leading to greater ties with
the foreign powers who enjoyed the benefits of the capitulations and a political loss due
to missionary education leading indirectly or directly to heightened nationalist tensions
among the various Christian minorities of the Empire.
As a corollary to the issue of consolidation, the paper also contributes to the study
of the continuity and change of the Tanzimat reforms into the Hamidian period.  The
actual history of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century contradicts the
prevailing model of the “Sick Man of Europe,” as recent scholarship has shown.  Overall,
Abdul Hamid II’s policies of centralization and consolidation made a definite impact,
especially in the Arabic speaking regions far from Istanbul.  Specifically, Hamidian
policies vis-à-vis the American mission were largely successful in creating a new status
quo that led the missionaries toward marginalization and secularization.  All of this was
accomplished despite the balancing act that the Ottoman government was forced to play
because of the ever-present threat of Great Power “diplomacy”—either through polite
discussions between diplomatic officials or the imposition of gunboats and soldiers.33
The interplay among Ottoman central authorities in Istanbul, local provincial
authorities, and other local power holders also contributes to the historiography of center-
periphery in the late Ottoman Empire, about which Hasan Kayali and others have written.
At least as far as the Ottoman initiatives against American missionary institutions go, a
complicated picture emerges where there was at times cooperation between central and
                                                 
32 See chapter two for a brief explanation of these groups.
33 The Great Powers refers especially to France, Britain, and Russia.
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local authorities and at other times disagreement.  Certainly, there was enough room in
the 1880s in Ottoman Syria for central authorities, provincial authorities, village
authorities, and millet authorities to each find arenas in which they might assert their
authority—and at times all joined together against the American missionaries.
In addition, this paper also is significant for its reevaluation of the 1885
controversy over the closing of mission schools.  It updates the work of Tibawi and Abu-
Ghazaleh, who interpreted Jessup’s response to the school closings based on his supposed
long-standing hatred of Islam.  Recent works on the Hamidian policy against
missionaries suggest that Jessup was actually responding to specific and new Ottoman
policies that benefited Islam and damaged Christian missionary interests.
Finally, this paper adds to the growing body of work about late Ottoman Syria-
Lebanon.  Especially Beirut, but also the surrounding areas in Syria-Lebanon, were
important areas of contact and controversy for many different groups that the Ottoman
authorities hoped to suppress.  The 1885 controversy also provides a unique view into the
impact of Hamidian censorship measures which affected the American mission, but
which also led to the exodus at the same time of various literary institutions to Cairo.
In conclusion, this paper focuses primarily on the context for missionary writing.
It finds both dualities and discrepancies among missionary perception, presentation, and
the reality of events.  It also explores the nature of the Ottoman response to American
missions.  It also hopes to shed light on the area of education both in the small scale of
missionary schools and more broadly in Ottoman Syria.  Ultimately, this project has
ramifications in three main areas: the history of American Protestant perceptions of
Islam, the history of American Protestant missions to the Ottoman Empire, and the
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history of the interaction between two very different cultures in the context of missions.
The paper then falls mainly under the rubrics of religious (missions) history,
imperial/colonial history, and the regional history of Ottoman Syria.
Outline of Paper
The first chapter will locate the arguments made in this paper in the fields of
history of missions and history of the late Ottoman Empire.  The methodology will
follow the recent work of Fruma Zachs and Ryan Dunch, who have argued for a new
reading of missionaries that rejects the common debates over imperialism and turns rather
to a study that emphasizes the unique and complex nature of missionary work.  Through
contextualization and awareness of local perceptions, missionaries are historicized and
removed from the past framework of “cultural imperialism.”
The second chapter will provide a brief historical background of the history of the
Presbyterian mission to Syria.  Through a description of the roots of the mission in the
Second Great Awakening and the prevailing American view of Islam in the early
nineteenth century, it will be possible to understand the world from which Jessup came to
be a missionary to Syria in 1856.  This chapter will also provide a brief history of the
Syria mission to 1860, when the disastrous civil war in Syria broke out, with a stress on
the policies, debates, and struggles of the mission.  This background information will
primarily emphasize how the history of the mission up to 1885 provides the context that
made the school closings in 1885 such a decisive moment.
The third chapter will provide a brief introduction to the 1885 school closings and
Jessup’s rhetoric surrounding the controversy.  This introduction will provide the reader
with key examples of Jessup’s perceptions of the controversy and his written language
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designed to convey the message that the Syria mission faced an immediate threat to its
continued work in Syria.  For Jessup, the threat came from an Ottoman government
imbued with Islam in order to limit missionary activity.
The third chapter will then continue to highlight key points in the history of the
Syria mission during the time of Jessup from 1860 to 1885 as a means of comparison
with the turning point of 1885.  Despite facing several crises during this time, Jessup’s
rhetoric was different in character from the missionary response to the 1885 controversy.
By evaluating Jessup’s rhetoric and response concerning the key events of this time
period, it becomes clear that he saw the main difficulties prior to 1885 as rebuilding after
the 1860 war, internal conflicts of the mission, continued struggles with native Eastern
Christians, and competition from other foreign missions—especially French and Russian.
The fourth chapter will entail an in depth study, especially through various types
of missionary documents, of the 1885 controversy.  The 1885 school closings were a
watershed in the history of the American mission to Syria that caused a shift in Jessup’s
language.  Jessup cast fear and blame more on the Ottoman government and Islam than
on the previous targets mentioned in the previous chapter, particularly Eastern Christians
and other foreign missionaries.  The analysis will demonstrate that a close reading of
missionary sources shows that this new rhetoric was partly due to his perceptions and
goals but also due to the reality of a recently increased climate of opposition to
missionary work under Abdul Hamid II.  Not only were the Ottoman authorities
attempting to limit or stop the influence of the American missionaries in Syria, they were
also implementing new policy initiatives, such as an increase in state-linked schools,
mosques, and ulama, that would supplant missionary influence.  Furthermore, the
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American mission also faced different circumstances in Syria as local Muslim and
Christian initiatives in the area of culture and education, the previous purview of the
missionary in their mindset, increased in Syria during these years.
The fifth chapter will act as a brief epilogue to the 1885 controversy.  The 1885
school controversy, in some ways, never really ended for the American mission.
Hamidian policies of centralization and censorship had taken their toll on missionary
initiatives, and the American mission grew increasingly secular and marginalized.  The
missionaries were forced to comply with Ottoman regulations, signaling a victory for the
Hamidian regime.  The missionaries still found ways to operate in Syria, but these
methods had to conform to Ottoman regulations more than before the 1885 controversy.
A new status quo developed as the missionaries, still under the leadership of Jessup into
the 1900s, eventually grew weary of resisting in vain the Hamidian policies that had
effectively limited American missionary initiatives that had grown strong by the early
1880s.
The sixth chapter will include the conclusion as well as mention some




The debate among scholars concerning the role of missionaries, especially those
during the period roughly between 1850 and 1950 when mission activity was high and
imperial activity was also high, centers around the question of the relationship between
missionaries and imperial/colonial power.  Scholars, specifically in the field of Middle
Eastern history but also in many other fields, have disputed whether to dub them outright
tools of colonialism, more subtle participants in the process of colonialism of culture and
the mind, bringers of beneficial aspects of Western modernity and Christianity who
unwittingly participated in actions beneficial to colonial regimes, or outright altruists
interested only in bringing the Christian gospel and needed services to the local people.
Whatever their exact role on this spectrum of analysis, the amount of argument about
missionaries suggests their continued importance to studies of this time period in many
places around the world, the Middle East and Syria not the least.  This importance is due
to the central point that “however we [scholars who work on missionaries] conceptualize
the process, there is no disputing that the Christian missionary movement in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was an important medium for the dissemination of
Western concepts and institutions into non-Western societies.”34  This chapter will
attempt to describe the methodological placement of this paper by highlighting some of
the key historiographical controversies surrounding the history of modern missions and
where this paper lands in those controversies.




There are essentially two main paradigms for how missionaries have been viewed
in the historiography concerning their connection with imperialism.35  The first is the
argument that missionaries were party to imperialism because they directly aided in the
political and economic colonization of local people and societies.  The second main
trend, which stems in large part from the post-colonial work of authors such as Frantz
Fanon,36 is to leave aside the question of the direct tie to political or economic forces and
to argue that missionaries were part of a process of “cultural imperialism.”  “Cultural
imperialism” argues that missionaries were important for the process of colonization
because they worked in the sphere that outright economic and political colonialism did
not—that of the culture of societies.  Both processes are dubbed “imperialist” because of
their “coercive imposition” where the politics, economics, and culture of an indigenous
society are altered and lose their previous dominant position by the outside force of an
empire.37
Probably the most important piece of scholarship concerning the field of Middle
Eastern history in the last thirty years is Edward Said’s Orientalism, which agrees with
both of the paradigms mentioned above.  This groundbreaking and complex study argues
essentially that the history of Western scholarship on the “East,” (here to the Arab world)
is intertwined with the processes and institutions of colonialism and can no longer be
seen as work of objective scholars.  This work, along with the broader corpus of post-
                                                 
35 Dunch, 308-309.  Dunch’s 2002 article, “Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Cultural Theory, Christian
Missions, and Global Modernity” is the key conceptual basis for this chapter.
36 For example, Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press,
1994).  This work was first translated into English in 1965.
37 Dunch, 302.
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colonial studies and in the 1990s subaltern studies, has changed the field of Middle
Eastern history to the extent that, arguably, all works published are in some ways
dependent on and influenced by Said’s work.  Most scholars have acknowledged that “the
transformation of the world in the modern era has involved the global extension not only
of political relations, industrial production, and trade, but also of cultural forms, nation-
states, rationalism and science, secularism in politics, constitutional government, and
mass education (in certain forms and emphasizing certain subjects), and these changes
have been intimately related to structures of power and dominance, and to colonialism in
particular.”38  The nature of Said’s evaluation dictated that Said would discuss the role
that Christian missionaries had to play in colonialism.  Said did not like what he saw.
Said argues that missionaries, be they French, British, or American, were all
participants in colonialism.  Said does not give an in-depth enough discussion of
missionaries for his work to be placed with confidence on the spectrum of the four
positions mentioned above, but he does argue that they “openly joined the expansion of
Europe.”39  Finding no difference between American missionaries and European ones
from the nineteenth century empires of France or Britain, Said argues that “the early
missionary institutions—printing presses, schools, universities, hospitals, and the
like—contributed of course to the area’s well being, but in their specifically imperial
character and their support by the United States government, these institutions were no
different from their French and British counterparts in the Orient.”40  Despite Said’s clear
admission that the United States was not an empire until the twentieth century, he still
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argues that   “ubiquitous” and “legendary” American missionaries to the Arab world were
a part of the process “during the nineteenth century [where] the United States was
concerned with the Orient in ways that prepared for its later, overtly imperial concern.”41
Finally, Said, with a footnote specifically to Jessup’s memoir 53 Years in Syria, asserts
that Americans in the Orient (including of course missionaries) constituted an “imperial
constellation facilitating Euro-American penetration of the Orient” that “has never
stopped.”42  In short, Said agrees in large part with the criticism of missionaries brought
by both of the paradigms mentioned above—that missionaries were involved in
colonization directly through economics and politics as well as in their impact on
indigenous cultures.
Another piece of more recent scholarship that follows along with Said’s
evaluation of missionaries in the Middle East is the work of Samir Khalaf, although
Khalaf avoids the term “cultural imperialism.”43  Khalaf, a Lebanese sociologist who
teaches at the American University of Beirut (which Jessup helped to start), portrays
Jessup as the classic example of a “Protestant Orientalist” who through his
“reconfirmation of disparaging stereotypes” contributed to the continuation of negative
American Protestant images of Islam.44  Khalaf harshly condemns Jessup, who “refused
to discard or even temper his defamatory images of the Levant or his arrogant
evangelistic perspectives,” as participating in a process of “cultural penetration.” 45
Khalaf does, however, stray from Said’s outright connection of American missionaries
                                                 
41 Said, 293-294.
42 Ibid., 294.
43 This section refers to chapters four through seven of Samir Khalaf’s 2001, Cultural Resistance, which all
concern American Protestant missionaries to Syria.
44 Khalaf, as opposed to other authors who have mainly used only his memoirs, does cite six of Jessup’s
publications.  Khalaf, however, does not use any of Jessup’s unpublished materials.
45 Khalaf, 35.
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with direct colonial coercion; instead, he contends that the missionaries participated in
“non-aggressive and unobtrusive measures.”46
Recent Scholarship and the Old Paradigms
Based especially on the impact of post-colonial and subaltern studies and to some
extent as a reaction against the harsh criticism from Said and his followers, recent
scholarship has argued for a change in the understanding of missionary work away from
either of these two main paradigms.  Recent scholarship takes the old historiography of
missions to task first by denying overt missionary connections with political and
economic colonialism (which Said argues by referencing payment from the United States
government).  Dunch agrees with the influential study of the Comaroff’s concerning
British colonization in South Africa47 in the rejection of overt colonial connections:
“generally speaking, neither mission societies nor missionaries as individuals were
directly influential with their home governments or their colonial representatives, nor
were they directly linked to the traders and economic interests of their home countries.”48
Rather, “the interests of missions were often diametrically opposed to those of their
compatriots in government or commerce, and the relationships on the ground between
missionaries, consular/colonial officials, and traders were as often cool or antagonistic as
warm or cooperative.”49  Even if this point is accepted however, the argument of “cultural
imperialism” still remains.
                                                 
46 Khalaf., 36.
47 Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and
Consciousness in South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
48 Dunch, 308.  According to Dunch, the Comaroff’s study does not reject the concept of “cultural
imperialism” which they call “colonization of consciousness.”  The Comaroff’s, however, were studying a
region that was directly colonized by the British in the nineteenth century, and that was exclusively
missionized by British missionaries.  This is quite a different situation from Syria, which had many
different groups of missionaries and was not directly colonized until after World War I.  See Dunch, 314.
49 Dunch, 314.
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Secondly, recent scholarship argues against the continued use of the term
“cultural imperialism” for four main reasons.50  First, it essentializes the nature of the
culture or civilizations that the missionaries brought as some sort of “imagined national
or cultural authenticity” (such as Said’s conflation of all Western missionaries, at all
times, and to all of the Orient).51  Secondly, it does not give enough agency to the local
culture for how that society desired, interacted with, altered, or rejected the message from
the missionaries.  Thirdly, it simplifies a series of complex relationships to that of
missionary and local receiver (Said’s vague declaration that missionary institutions
“contributed of course to the area’s well being”52).  At the same time, this simplification
of relationships “skews our gaze too much towards looking for subjugation,
collaboration, or resistance, or, even less usefully, towards fruitless debates about
motives and unsupportable distinctions between cultural exchange and cultural
imposition.”53  Finally, the term “cultural imperialism” is often used by scholars who are
actually discussing possible missionary connections with overt colonial power or
missionary racism and paternalism.  While these do at times exist (although certainly not
the majority), these both miss the main thrust of “cultural imperialism”—to look at the
actual impact of missionaries, not just at their attitudes.54
                                                 
50 Dunch., 318.  See pages 303-307 for the larger description of ten problems that he finds with the use of
the term “cultural imperialism.”
51 Samir Khalaf also presents an interpretation of American missionaries that gives little credence to
changes over time based on specific historical circumstances: “Jessup was still upholding the same
medieval mindset, with all the unflattering images, that he had carried over with him from New England
half a century earlier.”  Khalaf, 167.
52 Said’s opinion of Western Christian missions, and American missionaries specifically, in many ways
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impact across time and space, he ends up making the sort of argument about them that many of Said’s own





Dunch’s argument against “cultural imperialism” is founded upon the principle
that there is today a modern global culture that has not only brought changes to
indigenous cultures influenced by colonialism but also to the cultures from which
imperialism came.  This new “world order can quite reasonably be characterized as
hegemonic, that is, at once dominant and subtly coercive, yet also simultaneously
embraced, contested, and subverted by the human agents within it.”55  This new
framework applies to missionaries to suggest that they should be seen “simultaneously
[as] agents of the spread of modernity vis-à-vis non-Western societies, and products of its
emerging hegemony.”56
A New Turn
There has also been a recent push in the scholarship concerning missionaries to
leave behind the seemingly endless debates about just what exactly the missionary
relationship with the colonial, or at least expanding Western, power was.  Ussama
Makdisi argued in his 1998 article on American missionaries in Syria that there should be
a move away from the “heated debate mired in a fruitless endeavor to establish whether
or not the missionaries were ‘imperialist’.”57  Ryan Dunch argued in his 2002 article on
“cultural imperialism” and missions that scholars needed to “get beyond the polarized
praise and blame tendencies of earlier scholarship” since these provide “an unsatisfactory
model for analyzing either cultural interaction in general or the missionary movement in
world history in particular.”  Fruma Zachs in her 2005 article on American missionaries
and the Syrian Protestant College agreed with Dunch in her project to show that the
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56 Ibid., 318.  Emphasis is his.
57 Ussama Makdisi, “Reclaiming the Land of the Bible: Missionaries, Secularism, and Evangelical
Modernity,” The American Historical Review 102, no. 3 (June 1997), 681.
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“relationship between American missionaries and the local population was more
complicated than that expressed by either side of the debate and can be viewed as
including both arguments, depending on the individuals who were active at the time.”58
Jens Hanssen in his 2005 book about turn-of-the-century Beirut also attempted a similar
project that would shift the focus away from the imperialist debate.  His goal was to
provincialize (using the subaltern terminology from Chakrabarty59) the “European impact
on education and culture in the late Ottoman Empire” by demonstrating the complicated
nature of education in late Ottoman Beirut where there were “many connections between
thinkers, schools, and religions.”60
While each of these authors certainly still argues for various interpretations of
missionary work that place each author somewhere in the framework of the imperialist
debate, the point is that none of these authors wrote primarily about the relationship of
missionaries with imperialism, as, for example, Said did in Orientalism.  The primary
focus of each of these works was to demonstrate the complicated nature of the situation
where missionaries were working in a certain context; the authors’ positions’ on the role
of missionaries in imperialism is only of secondary or tertiary importance.  By accepting
then the basic point that the missionaries were involved in a system of give and take with
the local society where the missionary is an actor bringing change and a recipient of
change, the true historical complexity becomes clearer.  Historians can then move on to
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new questions concerning missionaries rather than falling into the old “vindicating or
vilifying” paradigm.61
These scholars have argued persuasively that there is greater benefit from and
ability to do studies of missionaries that: (a) recognize that their attitudes change over
time based on their own experience and interaction with local people and societies (b)
view missionaries more in their specific context and circumstances rather than just as
texts in vacuums62  (c) focus more on the actual impact of missionaries (d) evaluate the
local reaction to and perception of missionaries (e) evaluate them in a more comparative
(across different regions especially) light and (f) recognize them as one of many elements
in the spread of a “globalizing modernity” rather than necessarily tied with the spread of
a coercive imperialism that forced a Western modernity.63
Where this paper fits in
This paper seeks to follow in the theoretical path of the authors mentioned above
who have moved beyond the question of the relationship of the missionary to imperialism
to questions that address the complex of missionary interactions.  It will also attempt to
contribute to the growing body of work that addresses the six research topics mentioned
above.  In particular, the three main goals will be to recognize missionaries as changing
over time based on their surroundings, to read missionary texts in context, and to evaluate
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62 Here see especially Dunch, 309-311.  Missionary texts written for home consumption are often used to
generalize about the inherent Orientalism of missionaries.  These studies are “not always undertaken with
sufficient awareness of the context and purpose of the texts in question, or their relationship to actual
missionary practice on the ground (remembering that, unlike Said’s Orientalists, missionaries immersed
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63 See the works already mentioned by Dunch, Hanssen, Makdisi, and Zachs.  The term “globalizing
modernity” is from Ryan Dunch’s article.
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the local (in this case mostly Ottoman governmental, but also various local groups and
individuals) perception of missionaries.
Specifically, this paper will follow the methodological approach articulated by
Zachs’ maxim that “every missionary was a world of himself, with his own character and
understanding and should be examined as such.”64  This is especially true for Henry
Jessup who spent fifty-three years in Syria and therefore most of his life there—indeed he
was buried in Beirut.  Jessup’s long-term experience in the Syria mission certainly shaped
much of his thought.  Based the decentralized nature of the American mission where
control and policy did not radiate directly from either Boston or Beirut, studying
individual missionaries who had significant leeway in their own locale of mission work
fits the context of the Syria mission.65  Despite his overarching belief in the Syria mission
(as he saw it) and his position as Secretary of the mission from the 1870s, Jessup could
not and did not prevent other American missionaries serving in Syria from holding a
different understanding of events.  The amount of material available for study on Jessup,
both published and unpublished, also demonstrates the complexity of his thought and the
way that it changed over time.  Jessup’s changes of attitude, opinion, ideology, and
targets for blame and praise suggest that he never had a clear program of thought but was
rather shaped by the specific context of the time.  Finally, based on the fact that Jessup
                                                 
64 Zachs, “From the Mission to the Missionary,” 290.
65 Two brief examples illustrate this point.  Ussama Makdisi discusses the conflict that Henry Jessup,
Daniel Bliss, and other missionaries with to the Syria mission had with fellow missionary William Benton.
Unlike most of the members of the mission, Benton did not flee his mission station during the 1860 war in
Syria, did not blame the Druzes for the war, and held firm in his commitment to his mission station.
Benton was eventually dismissed from the mission and largely ignored by Jessup and Bliss when they later
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on October 23, 1890, Eddy declared his independence and complained to Jessup: “As soon as this visit is
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the Damascus vilayet.”  Presbyterian Historical Society (hereafter PHS), RG 115, Box 8, folder 10.
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was so closely involved with most of the major initiatives of the Syria mission, his
writings display a complex man who had different interests and concerns that would
often become intertwined.  Jessup also had enough longevity to be a part of the Syria
mission through multiple and crises of the mission including the 1860 war in Syria and
the 1885 school controversy.  Jessup was also a part of several periods in the mission
including its infancy period to 1860, its growth from 1860 to 1885, and its decline into
secularization and stagnancy in the 1890s and beyond.
At the same time, there are potential weaknesses to an approach that focuses on
one missionary.  Firstly, the project has the potential to devolve into a biography that
overly stresses Jessup as representative and as a result paints an incomplete picture of an
American mission made up of many unique figures.  Secondly, it could have the effect of
minimizing the extent to which the project contributes to Ottoman and Syrian history.
Finally, and most importantly, the focus on Henry Jessup could overemphasize the role of
American missions in Syria.  The American mission, although the oldest and largest in
Syria in the mid to late nineteenth century, was only one of many (Russian, German,
Italian, French) in Syria.  The American focus especially limits the reader’s view of the
large impact of French Catholic missions in Syria, which would eventually contribute to
the French being given the mandate of Syria after World War I.66
Ultimately, however, Henry Jessup provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the
complexity over time of the American mission to Syria.  Jessup never had a clear policy,
and certainly not one that governed his attitudes and actions through his fifty-three years
in Syria.  Certainly at times his policy did favor some form of increased Western
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imperialism in Syria, include comments that attacked Islam and Muslims, and blame the
Ottoman government for complex conflicts in Syria.  At other times, however, Jessup
highly valued the lack of imperialism in Syria, wrote comments that attacked Eastern
Christianity and Roman Catholicism much more than Islam, wrote comments that sought
common ground with and praised Islam, and praised the Ottoman government for its
beneficial and tolerant policies.  It would be incorrect to characterize Jessup completely
by any one of these stances because his attitudes must be evaluated in their specific
context.
The one overarching goal that does mark Jessup is his commitment to the
advancement of the mission, even though what exactly he thought or the Presbyterian
Board thought this “mission” was changed over time based on certain circumstances.
Jessup, as a devoted Presbyterian, believed that his calling transcended the constraints of
the Ottoman government, local hindrances, and even at times the disagreement of his
missionary board and fellow missionaries.  Also as someone who spent so long in Syria
and as part of a mission that had set down roots in Syria in the 1820s, Jessup felt a strong
connection to Syria that was reflected in his willingness to argue against the Ottoman
authorities who were attempting to institute their imperial program there.67
  The following chapter will begin the discussion of the history and context of the
American mission to Syria, which Jessup joined in 1856, thirty-seven years after the first
two members of the mission set forth for the Holy Land.  While Jessup was in some ways
following in the footsteps of those two men, Pliny Fisk and Levi Parson, in many ways,
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the context of the Syria mission had changed.  In order to understand Jessup and his
actions as a missionary in Syria, particularly his response to the 1885 school closings by
the Ottoman authorities, it is necessary to explore the roots and early history of the
American mission to Syria.  This exploration will demonstrate the complexity of
missions and of individual missionaries just discussed.  Later chapters’ comparison and
contrast with the next chapter’s discussion of the early history of the mission make this
even clearer.
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Chapter II: Historical Background
Introduction
A brief evaluation of the formative background of the American mission to Syria
up to 1856, when Jessup joined the mission, provides the necessary underpinning for
Jessup’s experience there as well as why 1885 was such a significant turning point for the
mission.  Before 1821, when the mission in Syria would actually commence, the Second
Great Awakening had provided the original motivation for the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions to begin its missionary work around the world.  The
specific nature of this millenarian enterprise combined with particular trends in American
religious and political history to determine the Levant as one of the central destinations of
that mission board.  The United States, more so than Europe, saw the Ottoman Empire as
the heartland of Islam and formed certain ideas about Islam based on that assumption.
The discussion of these two historical factors will provide a view into Jessup’s
background and experience in the United States before joining the Syria mission in 1856.
The contrast between the “other worldly” and “othering” trends of these two background
factors and the reality of the history of the American mission in Syria demonstrates the
importance of reading Jessup’s writing in a specific context of time and space.
Since the mission started in Beirut in 1821 and Jessup did not join the mission
until 1856, many formative events had already shaped the mission of which Jessup would
eventually become the Secretary in the 1870s.68  The two major developments in the
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history of the mission, which indeed are directly relevant to the situation during Jessup’s
time and specifically the 1885 controversy, were the turn from the attempt to work with
Jews and Muslims to working mainly with Eastern Christians and the turn from
proselytism to a focus on education.  Both of these were a result of difficulty in gaining
influence with the local population as well as legal barriers enforced by the Ottomans.
These changes occurred chiefly because of missionary experience working on the ground
in Syria over time that taught them to be more pragmatic and less idealistic in their goals
and actions.  The missionaries faced enough resistance from the local and Ottoman
authorities to cause them to alter their tactics, but not enough to cause them to give up
hope in the efficacy of the mission to bring transformation to Syria.69  Accordingly, this
chapter will also include some brief notes on the groups with which the American
missionaries were working as well as some major historical trends relating to the
Ottoman authorities.  The two major changes toward Eastern Christians and education
also went ahead despite opposition from the mission board and supporters at home, which
left the missionaries in Syria with an embattled sense of the importance of their mission.
This manifested itself in the reality that by the 1850s, Syria had become home for the
American missionaries.  During this time period in 1856, Jessup joined the mission, first
in Tripoli but for most of his fifty-three years in Syria, in Beirut.  Four years into Jessup’s
time in Syria, barely enough time for him to have learned the language very well, a civil
war struck the region east of Beirut and disrupted the American mission, the local
                                                                                                                                                  
the mission.  In this capacity, Jessup was in charge of the mostly native Christian teachers in the many
schools throughout Syria.  His responsibility as Director of Schools did not include authority over the
Syrian Protestant College, founded in 1866 and directed by Daniel Bliss, because the Syrian Protestant
College was a separate, although related, enterprise.
69 As will be seen more later, this view of transformation, as formulated chiefly by the American Board’s
Director Rufus Anderson (see below), was both religious and civilizational (civil-political-societal).  The
American mission did not make a distinction between the two.
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society, and Ottoman interests in Syria.  This event influenced Jessup in the same way
that his background in the United States and the history of the Syria mission did.
The Second Great Awakening and Millenarianism
Beginning in the late eighteenth century in England, and quickly transported to
the United States in the early part of the nineteenth century, the Second Great Awakening
was a grassroots movement among especially Baptist, Reformed (Congregationalists and
Presbyterians), and Methodist Protestant Christians in the English-speaking world.70  The
movement emphasized personal activity to help usher in the kingdom of God on earth.
As mentioned above, part of the theological underpinning of the movement was
eschatological.  Christians thought in terms of the end times, but believed that certain
conditions needed to be fulfilled before Christ would return and usher in the new
Millennium.71  The first of these was that the gospel message, as interpreted by these
Protestant groups, must be spread around the world; this would fulfill the Great
Commission in Matthew Chapter Twenty-Eight.  The second of these, a doctrine known
as Restorationism, was the idea that the Jews should be brought back to the Holy Land in
order for the conditions for Armageddon and their eventual conversion to Christianity to
be fulfilled.72  Mission to Muslims would fulfill both of these conditions, as the
proponents of this theology believed that Ottoman Muslim rule over the Holy Land
                                                 
70 For more information on the Second Great Awakening, especially its relation to missions, see Charles L.
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71 The Millennium refers to an expected thousand-year reign of Christ on earth where the nations would
follow Christ in his rule of justice, peace, and harmony.
72 This, of course, is the same ideology that has been responsible for Christian Zionism through the years.
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prevented this restoration of the Jews.73  All of this was based on a complex
eschatological theology popular at the time, which John Nelson Darby, a radical Irish
Anglican priest had first propounded in the late eighteenth century.74
Despite the fact that this movement placed a central focus on individual activity,
the movement caught on quickly especially in the Puritan based New England Reformed
Churches.75  With the reformation now three centuries years in the past, these Protestant
descendants of the Puritans hoped to carry on the same type of purifying work by
spreading the true gospel around the world, especially to the “heathen” populations, or
those who had never before been reached with the gospel.  This fit right in line with the
Puritan theology of John Edwards and others that saw America as a new Zion, where
American Christians had a responsibility to spread this unique blessing.  With the
increased ability to travel overseas and the increased reach of Western countries into
various parts of the globe by the early nineteenth century, the goal of being “salt and
light” to the world became at least more of a geographic possibility.76
In the early nineteenth century, these ideas became current in the prominent
colleges and seminaries of New England, especially Andover Theological Seminary,
where these ideas began to be put into practice.  Men from the schools and churches of
New England increasingly in the early nineteenth century gathered together to form
various mission organizations that would be responsible for the carrying out in practice of
                                                 
73 Along with the already cited works, see the concise description in Thomas S. Kidd, “Islam in American
Protestant Thought: Precious little courtesy or understanding,” Books and Culture: A Christian Review
(Oct. 2006).
74 Don Wagner, “For Zion's Sake,” Middle East Report no. 223 (Summer 2002): 53-54.
75 Oren, 82-86.
76 This was a common missionary conception of their work taken from Matthew Chapter 5.
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the theology of the Second Great Awakening.77  The first of these groups to turn its
attention overseas, from what had in the past been a mission to the indigenous peoples in
North America, was the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.78  This
group, first organized in 1810, included both Presbyterians and Congregationalists.  It
also had a particular interest in the Middle East.  As mentioned above, the Holy Land
figured prominently in the thought of the Second Great Awakening, and the American
Board would send its first two missionaries to the Middle East in 1819, Levi Parson and
Pliny Fisk.  This was the initial foundation of the Syria mission, of which Jessup became
a part in 1856, although the original destination of Parson and Fisk was Jerusalem.
Islam in the American Mindset
Besides the theological basis for the American Protestant interest in Syria and
Palestine, there were other tangible reasons within American political and religious
history for why this region was the focus of the American Board and other American
mission groups.  Underlying the more concrete examples of the Muslim world and the
Ottoman Empire that would confront Americans especially after 1800, there was a wealth
of Christian literature concerning Islam available for consumption.  The most prominent
of these works was Humphrey Prideaux’s The True Nature of Imposture Displayed in the
Life of Mahomet (1697), which was reprinted in the United States in 1798.79  This work,
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which represents a common theme in Western literature and sermons on Islam in this
time period, suggested that the Prophet had created Islam as a means to gain political and
military dominance.  Shortly after in 1702, Cotton Mather, a prominent Boston preacher,
wrote about some Europeans being held in captivity by North African pirates:
“Mahometan Turks, and Moors, and devils, are at this day oppressing many of our
sons.”80  The use of “Mahometan,” “Turks,” and “Moors,” all of which are incorrect and
prejudicial Western references to North African Muslim Arabs and Berbers, are even
equated with “devils.”  This parallel usage demonstrates how Mather set up the North
African Muslims as an example of what American Christians should see as the evil
“other.”   Another polemical tract, published in America in the late eighteenth century,
was The Conversion of a Mehometan.81  This tract contained a fictitious letter by a
“Turk” named “Gaifer” describing his conversion to Christianity—a device actually
intended by the author to make a theological point about Anglican Church authorities.
The term “Turk” would continue to be used by Western authors as  a prejudicial
reference to any Muslim or person from the “Orient,” despite the fact that Turks were one
of many ethnic groups in the Ottoman world and that some Turks were not Muslims.
Each of these works demonstrates that Muslims (Mahometans) and Turks (Ottomans, or
any Muslim from the “Orient”), were used by Western Christian authors and preachers as
a means to situate Western Christians in opposition to the “other” of the “Oriental.”  The
terminology used in these works such as (in all of its spellings) “Mohammedanism,”
“itself an Orientalist designation that gave undue centrality to the place of the Messenger
Muhammad in the faith of Islam”, was based on American ideas and domestic issues and
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not on any sort of real interaction with Muslims.82  In other words, the term
“Mohammedanism” was an inherent criticism of the Muslim faith because it implied that
Islam was actually a Christian heresy where Muslims worshiped the Prophet Muhammad,
which is false characterization of one of the three Abrahamic faiths.
One of the first international conflicts in which the new Republic of the United
States came into conflict with the Muslim world was that of the so-called Barbary
Pirates.83  In short, this was a series of minor conflicts between 1785 and 1815 over naval
rights in the western Mediterranean between the United States and the states of Algiers
and Tripoli.  The conflict, in which some American sailors were held captive, held
American interest because these North African territories represented “models of
despotism and decadence” to the new, and still developing Republic of the United
States.84  Americans, who may have already had a vague idea about Islam based on
popular literature and sermons, now had a concrete international situation that contributed
to their conception of Islam and the East.  Furthermore, the conflict symbolized for
Americans the growth of their influence internationally, where the East represented a
possible venue for growth of American influence vis-à-vis Europe.
The Ottoman Empire, ruled by the “despotic” sultan, represented the key image of
the Muslim “Orient” and all of its “despotism and decadence” especially to American
Protestants who saw their “republican system and moral culture, linked in many minds
with a clear sense of political destiny and religious mission, as one fit to replace (even if
only symbolically) the decadent and outmoded Turks, who many viewed as a despotic
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and satanic opposition.”85  Not until 1830 did the United States sign a formal treaty with
the Ottoman Empire, so as of yet there were few American travelers or merchants in the
Ottoman Empire.86  Based on the lack of physical interaction before 1830, the political
image of the “Barbary Pirates” and the literary images of polemical works like that of
Prideaux carried significant weight.
As opposed to Europe and European missionaries who actually had a greater
interaction with Islam in Africa because of the restrictions on direct proselytism of
Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of missions in West Africa,87
American Protestants remained focused on the Ottoman Empire, and specifically the
Holy Land.  In the Ottoman Empire, French mission efforts (renewed in 1831) focused on
creating or bolstering Uniate Catholic communities,88 and British missions (begun in
Syria and Palestine in 182389) were “early interested in developments which could bring
renewal to the ancient Eastern Churches.”90  What little sustained interaction missionaries
from either country had with Muslims was in Africa: the French in their North African
colonies and the British in West Africa.91  Especially beginning in the middle of the
nineteenth century, British sponsored missions in the Niger territories increased; even
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though this effort demonstrated “how resistant to Christianity Muslim communities
were.”92
American Christians, who similarly to their European counterparts had few
sustained encounters with Muslims (as will be seen below), focused more of their
missionary energy on sending missionaries the Ottoman Empire.  Protestant missionaries
turned towards (in their mindset) “what the West generally saw as the heart of the Islamic
world, where the Prophet’s deputy, the leader of the faithful [the sultan], presided over
the immense, if ramshackle” Ottoman Empire.93  Moreover, the fact that the Ottoman
Empire was a region where Europe did not have anything other than an infant British
mission by 1820 added to American Protestant interest there because they had a chance to
make their own mark.94
A significant part of the American image of the Ottoman Empire included its
purpose for American domestic issues—either as a negative model of what America
should not be or as a positive model of what America should be.  In both cases, the
Ottoman Empire became the “other.”  As mentioned above, the Ottoman Empire
represented a negative theological, political, and moral example of the other.  A further
example is that of prophetic literature, which contributed especially to the Protestant
Second Great Awakening view of Islam. 95  In the apocalyptic worldview of these
prophecies, the growth of foreign missions was crucial for the eventual downfall of
Islam, as some Protestants interpreted Revelation Chapter Sixteen.96  These prophecies
actually had their foundation in internal American issues: “by figuring Islam as a





96 Kidd, paragraph eight.
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temporary scourge that God would soon remove, eschatology enabled American
Christians to resolve the problem of Islam by explaining it within the terms of their own
cultural desires and beliefs.”97
But not only was the Ottoman Empire the negative example of decadency,
backwardness, despotism, and false religion, it was employed at the same time as a
positive model for reform.98  The two key examples of this positive usage are
drunkenness and slavery, which many Protestant reformers saw as significant blights to
their image.  Other negative aspects of American society according to these reformers
included “xenophobia, exploitation, racism, and sectarianism.”99  These reformers
thought that “if only Americans could reform the behaviors in their own midst that
tarnished their ideals of democracy and Christianity, then the nation would assume its
exemplary power to influence the world, even before the act of venturing into foreign
terrain.”100  Overall, this process occurred in three steps: (a) “infidelizing” negative
aspects of American society to make them seem even worse by their association with
foreign practices (b) ills of American society that had been “infidelized” then extended
domestic reform into an international campaign that enlarged American influence and
finally (c) the positive use of the Ottoman Empire to demonstrate the true depth of
American vice.101  Ultimately, while this process “showed more openness to Islam than . .
. earlier stereotypes,” it did not demonstrate “any abiding interest in the religion of
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Islam.”102  Of course, what made this vision of the Ottoman Empire possible, even
though used for a domestic purpose, was actual interaction with it including travelers’
accounts that increased after 1830 and missionary writings that began a decade before.
The New England Protestants who first joined the American Board’s mission to
the Holy Land in the early 1800s were shaped by a combination of the theology of the
Second Great Awakening, the politics of American Republicanism and its interaction
with Algiers and Tunis, the traditional Western literature on Islam, and American
prophetic media.  These missionaries would not, however, continue to be wholly shaped
by these influences.  Once the missionaries physically arrived in the Ottoman Empire,
they began to experience and describe in writing a “somewhat more realistic portrayal of
the practices of Ottoman life, which helped instigate a slow reassessment of derogatory
stereotypes of the Turk,” even though the term continued to be used incorrectly as a
reference to Ottomans or Muslims.103
In general however, the impact of various American religious and political
interactions with Islam and the Ottoman Empire on individual missionaries is an area that
requires further study.  For example, Henry Jessup’s diary from his seminary years would
hopefully provide clarity on just how New England Protestants interacted with the
various material available concerning Islam and the Ottoman Empire.104  A study of the
curriculum of the seminaries which Jessup and other missionaries attended in the
northeastern United States would also add to this understanding.  Most probably, each
missionary was impacted in a unique way by different influences; but for those who came
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in the years after the mission had been founded, official mission publications such as the
American Board’s Missionary Herald probably provided an important resource.
From Jews and Muslims to Eastern Christians
Fisk and Parson, the first American Board missionaries to the Middle East, grew
up and were educated in this American and American Protestant climate.  The two set out
first for Jerusalem in 1819 where their mission was to explore the possibility of future
direct proselytism with Jews and Muslims there.  Before arriving there, they spent time
learning language and marshaling connections in Smyrna (Izmir), where Parson grew
sick and was unable to continue.  Fisk, now joined by Jonas King, who had already
learned some Arabic, attempted to move on to Jerusalem; however, these early
missionaries saw quickly that direct proselytism, especially to the Jews and Muslims of
the Holy Land was if not a lost cause, then certainly an incredible challenge.105  Several
legal impediments prevented mission work there: “Franks” were not legally allowed to
live in Jerusalem, proselytism of Muslims was illegal in the Ottoman Empire, and even
proselytism to Jews and Eastern Christians faced legal and administrative problems based
on the organization of the millet system.106  At this point in time, if an Ottoman subject
had converted to Protestantism, they would have lost their legal status.  As a result of the
hostility faced in Jerusalem, the missionaries moved north to Beirut.  Beirut not only was
more welcoming in that it had a higher proportion of Christians than Jerusalem (Beirut
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was in fact a majority Christian city),107 but it also still fit within the missionary ideology
of doing mission in the Holy Land of Syria, even though the epicenter of Jerusalem had
been abandoned for the present.  The missionaries knew quite well that Jesus had visited
Tyre and Sidon, just south of Beirut.
While Beirut may have been more welcoming than Jerusalem, the missionaries
still faced the same imposition against preaching to Muslims and Jews.  Similar to
American perceptions of Ottoman subjects as “Turks” and “Mohammedans,” the Fisk
and King faced the difficulty of being foreigners who were fit into existing domestic
images.  The Americans were known by the terms “Frank” (dating back to the Crusades),
“infidel,” or more correctly as “English.”108  Especially before the American treaty with
the Ottomans in 1830, the Americans were legally recognized by the Ottoman authorities
as members of the English millet, not to mention the language that Parson and King
spoke.  The American missionaries adapted quickly to the new situation however, and
came to a new strategy as soon as 1826.  They now saw that their best approach was to
“rouse ‘nominal’ Christians from their slumber and then to hope that they would in God’s
good time impart the Christian message to the Jews, Muslims, and Pagans.”109  This
approach was a convenient compromise with the original goal: the first mission to
Muslims and Jews (based on millenarian theology) was not abandoned, but at the same
time mission work could continue under the current political circumstances.
Furthermore, the missionaries’ hoped that this new method might actually work better in
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the long run; who better to convert Muslims than those Christians who had lived with
them for over a millennium?110  But in order for this to take place, the missionaries
believed that Eastern Christians must be instructed in the essentials of the Protestant
gospel, including the sinfulness of humanity, the necessity of sanctification through the
Holy Spirit, and salvation by faith alone through the grace of Christ.111  The missionaries
believed that these ‘nominal’ Christians had fallen into “ignorance and superstition” and
were therefore in no state to spread their faith effectively.112
There were many different groups of Eastern Christians as well as various
heterodox Muslim groups that the missionaries at times struggled to reach with their
message after turning their immediate focus away from Muslims and Jews.  This task
became all the more difficult when Catholic missions to the Middle East were renewed in
1831 because some of these groups already had historical connections with the Church in
Rome.113  The field of the American mission in Syria contained at least five Christian
communities114 including the Maronites,115 Greek Orthodox (both the Arabic rite and
Greek rite),116 Melkites (Greek Catholics),117 and Armenians.118 In such a diverse region
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as Syria, the missionaries worked with other Christian groups as well, but these five
figured most prominently in the region.  The American mission also had periodic success
working with the local Druze119 and Nusairi-Alawi120 communities, with whom the
American mission would still seek to work during Jessup’s time as Secretary of the
mission in the 1870s and 1880s.
Even though there was no official proscription against proselytism of these
various Christian groups, the missionaries still had a difficult time beginning their work
with them.  This was not due to any official Ottoman effort, but rather to the initiative of
the leadership of each of the local Christian communities who shunned all manifestations
of Protestant initiative.  These ecclesial leaders, the “principal enemies” of the American
mission, even went to the extent of “repeatedly anathematizing any of their flock who
had dealings with the Protestants.”121  Certain church leaders had more success than
others in persuading their flock to stay away from the missionaries, however.122  The
Maronites, based on their historic connection with Rome and France, were particularly
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resistant.123  In order to best reach these groups of Christians—particularly the Greek
Orthodox and Armenians who had a significant population, faced the least opposition
from their clergy, and were the most receptive to the Protestant message—the American
mission hoped to provide schooling for their children.  Based on the lack of other schools
capable of presenting more than traditional education to young pupils and the other
public services that mission houses offered (such as medical care), Syrians slowly began
to participate in the efforts of the American mission.
From Proselytism to Education
After an initial rough period in the 1820s and into the 1830s when the continuance
of the mission was very much in question and only a handful of missionaries worked in
Syria, the mission grew slowly but steadily.  The mission continued to expand its small
network of schools, most of which were primary or common schools, that taught basic
reading in Arabic through the medium of the Bible.  The teachers were native Syrians,
and the schools met in houses that the missionaries rented.124  At the same time, various
political events encouraged the Syria mission to hope for more success.  In 1830, the
United States signed a formal agreement with the Ottoman Empire, allowing Americans
to travel freely, with the proper paperwork, in the Ottoman Empire.  This would at least
allow American missionaries entering the field of Syria more leeway on their stopping
points in Istanbul, Smyrna, and Cyprus.  Syria also saw change in the 1830s.  Ibrahim
Pasha, the son of Mehmed Ali of Egypt, took over the rule of Syria during the 1830s as
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part of Mehmed Ali’s challenge to Ottoman rule.  While the American mission was still
very small at this point, Ibrahim’s rule encouraged liberalization and Western influences,
so the missionaries were able to work in more freedom than before 1830.125  In order to
gain Western support against Mehmed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, the Ottomans sought the
help of the Great Powers, for which the Ottomans in return issued the first of the
Tanzimat edicts in 1839.126  For the Syria mission, this represented another gain and
further possibility for mission work because the Tanzimat declared greater equality
across confessional lines within the Empire.  In 1844, shortly after this edict was issued,
the Ottomans abrogated the death penalty for apostasy from Islam.127  The second of the
Tanzimat edicts in 1856 even gave the missionaries hope that Muslims could legally
convert to Christianity, although the Ottomans held to a different interpretation of this
law that still prevented conversion.128  The combination of the various Ottoman reforms
in this period caused the Syria mission to grow in its boldness and hope that the legal-
political constraints set against them would one day be repealed.
By the 1840s the mission was beginning to attract new missionaries and more
funds, which allowed the mission to set up new schools and churches in Syria.
Eventually, the mission had grown strong enough to attract some converts, which became
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Shari’a was the law of the land and the entire structure of Ottoman authority was underpinned by the
legitimacy of the sultan as a Muslim ruler. . . the Ottoman government could not possibly tolerate any
questioning of the truth of Islam.  That could only be seen as subversive and having practical
consequences.”  Also see Tibawi, American Interests, 175.
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a debate with the Ottoman authorities and the mission itself.  Up until this point, there
had been a debate within the mission about whether a native church with native
leadership should be formed or not.129  Until the late 1840s, those who believed in the
message that the missionaries brought would have mostly remained in their old churches
as “reformed” members of their historical millet.  Rufus Anderson, the head of the
American Board from 1832 into the 1860s, was a strong proponent of the anti-
civilizational ideology that argued for evangelization by missionaries that led to the
formation of a local church under local control.130  For Anderson, the work of bringing
“Christian civilization” (Western, especially Protestant, civilization) was not the direct
responsibility of the missionaries.  Rather, transformation would come from within as the
gospel took root.
The controversy in the 1840s over those Syrians (formerly Greek Orthodox) who
had declared themselves Protestants lingered until British consular officials intervened
with the Porte.  The British, who saw a possibility to increase their influence through the
protection of what would be the new Protestant millet, were able to influence the
Ottomans to concede the issue and grant an official millet status (meaning the community
would have official legal status in the Empire and would have a native representative to
advocate to the Porte) to the tiny Protestant community in Syria.131  The American
mission rejoiced in what they saw as a major victory.   It was especially important
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because, at this point, the mission still had no assurance that it would be able to continue.
Rufus Anderson had been known to shut down ineffective missions (meaning those
which did not see enough people converted) and he also made periodic trips to visit and
oversee specific mission fields.
Anderson’s anti-civilizational ideology for the mission also dictated that
education should only be done as a means to the end of bringing people to Christ.
Anderson’s framework for the mission did cause some conflict between the Board in the
Boston and some of the missionaries in Syria who wanted to push education that focused
more on secular subjects because this would put the missionary schools in higher demand
and contribute to the civilizational transformation of Syria.132  In the end, Anderson won
out in the controversy because schools, especially primary schools, could still be started
even under Anderson’s framework where schools provided the essential teaching that
would lead students toward Christ.  American schools expanded into the 1850s because
the type of education that the mission schools provided still included enough of the
subjects that local Syrians demanded, especially training in English.  For example, the
Beirut High School, the first of the American missionary boarding schools, opened in
1835 and operated for seven years.133  Despite the higher cost of these schools, the
mission board saw this as a unique opportunity to carry out Anderson’s conception of
schools leading to religious reform because it could carry on the early teaching from the
common schools into a higher level.  The Beirut boarding school taught arithmetic,
grammar, geography, astronomy, history, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, logic,
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and the English language.134  Clearly, these mission schools were much more than simple
Sunday schools.  The Beirut school was only for boys, but the mission also conducted
schools for girls, often run by the wives of missionaries.135  The girls’ schools were
designed differently from the boys’ schools because of local and missionary gender
conceptions.  The first girls’ school was opened in Beirut in 1833 and gave its first public
examination in 1836.136  The examination included the subjects of reading, spelling,
geography, arithmetic, scriptures, English, and music.  This subject matter took up about
half of the time of the girls in the school; the other half was spent “in learning domestic
arts, including sewing.”137  All of the mission schools focused on teaching in the
vernacular of Arabic, which contributed to their success, especially as opposed to their
key competition of the French Jesuits who mostly taught in French to Maronites.  The
schools were also particularly successful because once students began their education in
the lower level common schools, which were often the only modern schools in the region,
they would be more likely to continue in American schools at higher levels.  The
missionaries hoped that by spending more time in the context of American missionary
education, students would be more likely to be converted, or at least influenced by,
Protestant theology, practice, and worldview.
Conclusion
By the 1850s, Rufus Anderson’s policies had become firmly implanted in the
mission.  More students, beginning in the late 1820s, had now been through the American
missionary educational system.  As Ottoman policies from 1839 to 1856 continued to
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become more liberal based on pressure from the Great Powers, the missionaries grew in
their hope for increased latitude for their work.  More practically, because the Ottomans
had done little to limit the growth and tactics of the Syria mission as exemplified by their
allowance of the Protestant millet in 1847, the missionary efforts on the ground in Syria
continued to expand.  By the late 1850s, there were nine mission stations in Syria: Beirut,
‘Abeih, Sidon, Hasbayya, Dair al-Qamar, Bhamdun, Kafr Shima, Tripoli, and Homs.
There were four native Protestant churches with a total of seventy-five members,
although none had native pastors.  The thirty primary (common) schools, however, did all
have native teachers.138  This was the state of the mission that Henry Jessup joined in
1856, after being trained at Union Theological Seminary in New York City.  Upon his
arrival, he was first stationed at the mission station in Tripoli.    Jessup came with a new
set of “reinforcements” of American missionaries including Daniel Bliss (the eventual
founder of the Syrian Protestant College) who signaled the success of the now thirty-
seven year old mission.139  These new missionaries, especially Jessup and Bliss, would go
on to have a key impact on the mission into the twentieth century.
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Chapter III: Context and Rhetoric 1860-1885
Introduction to the controversy of 1885
The Syria mission of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in
the United States faced its greatest challenge beginning in 1885 when the Ottoman
authorities began to forcibly close American missionary schools.  Henry Jessup, who
arrived at the Syria mission in 1856, and had experienced the civil war in Syria in 1860
and other difficulties for the mission, described the controversy over schools that began
in 1885 in very stark terms that suggest a beginning of a new period in the history of the
mission.  In both published and unpublished sources, Jessup, the stated clerk or
corresponding secretary of the Syria Mission since sometime in the 1870s,140 described
the growing connection of the Ottoman government with an overtly exclusionist Islamic
policy.  For the American mission, which had more than once been in danger of being
closed,141 this new policy and the corresponding closing of mission schools had the direct
effect of threatening to bring to an end all of the gains that the mission had made since
the chaos of the war in Syria in 1860.  Jessup argued that this constituted a clear change
from the tolerant policies of the Tanzimat period (to 1876) where the place of Christians
(both native Christians and missionaries) within the Ottoman Empire had grown steadily.
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According to Jessup, more than ever before, the Ottoman government wielded the
authority of Islam for their own ends and persecuted Christian establishments in the
Empire accordingly.  Analysis of Jessup’s rhetoric surrounding the 1885 controversy will
be pursued in depth in chapter four; this brief section is designed to give an initial picture
of his perceptions.
In the Memorial of Missionaries,142 composed by Jessup in the initial aftermath of
the first school closings of 1885, Jessup describes his perception of the new Ottoman
measures.  Jessup goes on to present why the closings were not only, according to his
Western-Christian interpretation of the Tanzimat reforms to which the Ottomans
disagreed,143 illegally prejudicial against Christians and therefore contrary to past decrees
of the government but also unbearable because the Ottoman authorities did not even carry
out their own laws for the legal maintenance of schools in the Ottoman Empire.
The most stringent orders have been sent to all the Turkish officials [from
Istanbul to the provinces in Syria] to close at once all Christian schools
which have no firmans.  Mohammedan schools are not interfered with, but
on the contrary, the local authorities are everywhere enjoined to open
schools for the Mohammedan children, for which Khotibs144 or
Mohammedan teachers will be supplied . . . The law as now being
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enforced, tends to the utter extinction of all village schools, except those
taught by Mohammedan Khotibs, and discriminates against Christianity.
Christian children cannot attend the schools of Mohammedan Khotibs.
The Koran is the text-book; the Khotibs are fanatical Mohammedans,
acquainted only with Mohammedan books, and teaching only
Mohammedan doctrines.  Such is the state of prejudice in villages, that
Christian children cannot attend schools taught by Mohammedans, nor is
it likely that they would be allowed to do so. . . Thus whole Christian
communities are being deprived of all means of instruction, and the poor
people left to see their children grow up in ignorance.145
Clearly, Jessup frames the situation in terms of persecution on religious grounds.
This position was based principally on his perception of American mission schools as
“the only means of education and enlightenment open to the Christians of Syria and
Palestine”146 and Ottoman backed schools as nothing less than the “schools of
Mohammedan Khotibs” taught by “fanatical Mohammedans.”147  Jessup was particularly
incensed by this situation based on the widespread influence of American mission
schools in the villages of Syria, where the presence of any school that taught foreign
languages and reading was unique.
In order to evaluate this missionary writing in its proper context, more of the
immediate history of the mission must be described, again with a focus on the nature of
missionary language concerning the events from 1860 to 1885.  The rest of this chapter
will evaluate this period where the mission built back up after the disastrous civil war of
1860.  Missionary writing, particularly that of Henry Jessup, during this time period
reflected the various events and climate of this time period, just as they did after 1885;
however, the situation had changed after 1885, as Jessup’s writing clearly reflects.
                                                 




Introduction to 1860 to 1885
The major conflicts for the Syria mission during Jessup’s years there before 1885
did not have to do with Islam or the Ottoman authorities.  Jessup’s writing during this
time period leading up to the crisis of 1885 demonstrate his own development as a
missionary as well as the major issues that faced the mission during this time period.
Some new issues, problems, and competing forces faced the mission after 1860; but on
the whole, Jessup’s writing describes how the American mission’s chief problems in this
period remained the same as those before 1860.  The larger issues that caused problems
were rebuilding after the war of 1860, the internal mission issues of funding and
ideology, the encroachment of other foreign missions, and rejection from local Eastern
Christians.  All of these controversies are reflected in Jessup’s writing—both published
and unpublished.  Secondly, Jessup’s writing on Islam and the Ottomans during this time
period demonstrates two things: that they were less of a problem for Jessup than the
previously mentioned issues and that secondary sources written about Jessup have often
given a false impression of Jessup by not addressing the fact that Jessup was only
secondarily concerned about Islam and the Ottomans.  The discussion of Jessup’s writing
on Islam will demonstrate additionally, however, that Jessup, at least in published sources
for home consumption, reified many prevailing American stereotypes about the
“Mohammedan” for American readers.  Furthermore, during this time period, Jessup’s
negative portrayals of Islam and Muslims were not directly connected with the Ottomans,
as they would be after 1885.  Finally, American mission schools increased significantly
during this time period, which was a causal factor for the controversy in 1885.  By 1885,
Jessup felt that the mission had grown, especially in the area of schools, to the extent that
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it contributed to his feeling of justification in responding vehemently even to official
Ottoman measures that carried the weight of military and legal force.
This chapter will primarily use Jessup’s published sources from the period after
1860 up to 1885 including his writing in the Missionary Herald,148 and two of Jessup’s
books Syrian Home Life (1874) and The Mohammedan Missionary Problem (1879).
Evaluation of these sources will be supplemented by selected secondary sources’
evaluations of Jessup’s writing during this time period.  By focusing on selected portions
of Jessup’s published materials up to 1885, more weight will be concentrated on Jessup’s
writing after 1885 in chapter four.  Furthermore, Jessup’s published writing prior to 1885
highlights the contrast of Jessup’s rhetoric before and after 1885.  Jessup came into his
own during this twenty-five year period from 1860 to 1885, as he increased his
publishing beginning with his first book in 1873 entitled The Women of the Arabs.149
Jessup also became the Secretary of the American mission in the 1870s.  However,
neither of these points suggests that judgment on Jessup’s attitudes as a missionary
should be based entirely on his publications of this period.  Jessup’s later writing changed
based on different historical circumstances, which further demonstrates the point that
Jessup cannot be said to have had one ideology that was the underlying cause of all of his
opinions and actions throughout his fifty-three years in Syria.
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Before moving into a discussion based on Jessup’s publications, it should be
made clear that missionary publications were designed and written for a specific purpose.
This necessarily meant that the account would be exaggerated:
For the pious, simple folk who take great interest in missionary enterprise,
but who are entirely ignorant of the circumstances of missionary work, the
sun must always shine; a cloud on the horizon is intolerable; this is, as it
were, the condition of their support; the result is the issue of reports
positively grotesque in their optimism, in which Scripture texts jostle
strangely with palpably exaggerated retrospects and forecasts.150
This description of missionary publications came from an American missionary to
northern Iraq in the mid-nineteenth century, so his background and mission conception
was very similar to Jessup’s.  This does not explain away the often pejorative and
polemical language in missionary publications, but it does place it in context.   Jessup’s
goal was not to provide a clear historical account.
The Impact of the War of 1860
The 1860 civil war in Syria wrought changes on Syrian society, Ottoman policies
concerning Syria, and missionary conceptions of the future work of the mission in
Syria.151  In short, the war was fought mainly between the Druzes and Maronites that
incorporated class, territorial, and religious discontents.  The Maronites lost the war badly
causing the French and other Great Powers to take great interest based on their tradition
of “protecting” the Christians of the Ottoman Empire.  Western gunboats were stationed
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off the coast of Beirut and French troops were dispatched.  The Ottomans led by the
delegation of foreign minister Fuad Pasha and largely due to Western pressure, attempted
to reassert control through harsh imposition of their imperial rule on what they viewed as
a backward and tribal society.152  Syrians, notably the intellectual figure Butrus al-
Bustani, were shocked by the war and attempted to implement reforms in society that
would prevent a similar outbreak of violence in the future.153  For example, in 1863
Bustani started a school in Beirut, al-madrasa al-wataniyya, which consciously sought to
instill a Syrian identity across confessions.  Jessup’s reaction and response to the war,
while very different, was no less jarring for the future of the mission.
The American mission was left in disarray in the practical maintenance of the
mission as well as the conception of what the mission should look like in the future.
While the roots and early history of the mission remained an important foundation for the
Syria mission, the fact that the war caused almost all of the American missionaries to flee
to Beirut and all of the schools to be closed determined that the Syria mission faced a
new beginning after the war in 1860.154  Jessup, who had been in Tripoli for his first four
years in Syria, remained in Beirut for the rest of his years in Syria.  In a report published
in the Missionary Herald from June first to sixth of 1860, Jessup described the results on
the mission of the “deadly strife” of the war: “at present out educational labors, all our
itinerancy and book distribution, and much of our preaching, are seriously interrupted.”155
Even five years after the war ended and having gained three new missionaries in 1863,
the American mission still complained of having only about half of the workforce that it
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had before the war.156  The schools, the main manifestation of the American mission in
Syria, suffered especially due to the war.  By contrast, in 1858, there were thirty primary
schools and two higher schools, and in 1870 there were as few as seven schools with only
one higher school.157  So even with ten years in which to rebuild the mission after 1860,
the American mission still struggled to rebuild after the losses caused by the war.
Jessup and most of the other missionaries, with the notable exception of William
Benton who was later cast out of the mission for his contradictory actions,158 held to the
explanation of the Great Powers that the Druzes were the first to blame for the war,
European intervention was needed even if French protection would be “most unfavorable
to the prosecution of the missionary work,” and that the Ottoman government had used
the war to the their own advantages.159  Jessup’s account, however, is not cut and dry.
Jessup’s description of the war in his letters published in the August of 1860 Missionary
Herald not only adds to Western misconceptions about the war and the Ottoman Empire
but also presents a complex account of various causes for the war.  For example, he
makes little distinction between Druzes and other Muslims, Maronites and other Syrian
Christians, or various local officials and “Turkish officers.”160  At the same time, multiple
groups in addition to the Druzes are correctly blamed for the conflict, including “Greek
and Papal ecclesiastics [who] have been stirring up their people to a war of extermination
against the Druzes.”161  Overall, he exhibits a confusion and panic characteristic of
someone in the midst of a chaotic situation where his life was in danger; rumors are
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passed along as possible truth to the American audience including the possibility that “the
Pasha of Beirut, it is said, furnishes the Druzes with ammunition.”162  But Jessup does not
suggest that the Ottoman governor of Beirut is acting out of Ottoman-Islamic hostility
towards Christianity, rather the governor was “very anxious to see the fall of a town
[Zahleh] which for years [had] been in rebellion against the Sultan.”163  At the same time,
Jessup’s chaotic description of the conflict and the language that he uses to do so can
only have bolstered American Orientalist perceptions of the Ottoman Empire: “it would
not be surprising should a new crusade against Druze and Mohammedan despotism be
awakened in Europe.”164
In the end however, while Jessup may have blamed the Ottomans for not taking
an active role in defending Syrian Christians in the war and for possibly contributing to
their demise, he did not frame his criticism as a critique based on the Ottomans being
Muslims.  The chaos of the war, not the Ottomans, had forced the closing of mission
schools.  Jessup saw the Ottomans as a conniving political entity, not an oppressive
Muslim force, which hoped to play off various groups in Syria against each other in order
to increase their own rule there.  He also does not describe one “Ottoman”
entity—various Ottoman officials acted out of different interests.  In addition, Jessup
does not show any positive inclination toward an increase in Western rule in Syria; he
actually displays frustration at the possibility of the increase of French and Russian
influence.165  Jessup concludes his letter with evangelical language that demonstrates
both his own confusion about the events but also the nature of his audience: “the work is
                                                 





the Lord’s and he will carry it on.”166  Having fled to the safety of Beirut, Jessup and the
rest of the American mission in Syria faced the difficult task of rebuilding what had been
started in 1821.  Even though the war ended due to Ottoman and Western intervention,
the mission still faced an uphill climb because of internal issues in the mission.  This
difficult rebuilding process hardened Jessup’s resolve to carry on the work of the mission
against all adversaries.
Internal Difficulties in the Mission
Funding
Jessup was certainly aware of the possibility that the Syria mission would not be
able to continue.  Whether this would occur by a direct closure by the American Board,
as was possible in the 1840s,167 or simply from a lack of funds, Jessup could not be sure.
Unfortunately for Jessup and the American mission, the period after the war in Syria in
which the mission desired to rebuild coincided with the civil war in the United States.
Secretary Anderson mandated that a third of the funds for the mission would be cut and
that the scope of the mission would be limited so as not to attempt to compete with other
European missions who had more funds.168  Jessup resorted to direct pleas for funds in
his articles in the Missionary Herald.  In a letter from August of 1861, Jessup hoped to
gain funds from readers by describing the situation in Syria as presently dark but with a
definite latent possibility for great growth of the mission and conversion of Syrians to
Protestantism.  The period directly following the end of the Syrian civil war was a time
when “the call for help was coming in earnest tones, from various parts of the land
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hitherto inaccessible to the missionary; and we hoped for a glorious harvest, after the
forty years ‘sowing in tears’ of the Syria mission.”169  As a result, the present need for
funds from American Christians was great, but they “cannot go forward; [their] hands
were tied; [they] have not the means.”170  Although aware of the difficulty of the civil
war for American Christians, Jessup followed the model of other American Protestants
who hoped that negative aspects of American society would be done away with in order
to make American missions more vital and influential.  Jessup questioned, “will it [the
war] not elevate the American church to a new standard of piety, increase prayer, and
prepare the way for new and vigorous prosecution of the missionary work throughout the
world?”171  Jessup, as a New School Presbyterian from the north who supported
abolitionist movements, was aware of the ills of the society from which he came,
although this awareness is certainly not prominent in his writings.172  Finally, Jessup
stressed to his readers that without funds the people of Syria would go to Catholic
schools: “shall our native helpers be obliged to enter secular employments, and the youth
of Syria be given over to the Jesuits for want of Protestant schools?”173  Not once in this
appeal does Jessup mention the Ottomans or Islam; instead, the major threats to the future
of the American mission are native Eastern Christian clergy and Catholic missions
efforts.
Based on the lack of funds, the American mission did not receive as many new
reinforcements from the United States and was forced to compromise on primary schools,
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to which they granted more independence.  Rather than direct control by the Americans,
schools run by native teachers were given grants provided that they used the Arabic Bible
and accept “occasional visits by members of the mission or their native agents.”174
Although seen as an unfortunate decision based on a lack of funds at the time, this shift in
policy would end up contributing the great growth of the mission in the period leading up
to 1885, as will be discussed briefly below.  The confusion, complicated by the lack of
funds, over just how the mission should proceed with its work, especially in a climate
where other European missions were growing in size and influence,175 further hindered
American missionary efforts after the war of 1860.
The Ideology of the Mission
The American mission in Syria, from its beginnings in the 1820s, had been in
conflict among its own missionaries and with the American Board in Boston over just
what strategy the mission should follow for its work in Syria.  This was another issue in
the period after 1860 that employed the American mission’s time and energy.  While
there had been some clear developments over the years including the shift from Jews and
Muslims to Eastern Christians and the shift from proselytism to education, Anderson’s
anti-civilizational strategy had limited the American mission from gaining a wide
following in Syria because it did not directly coincide with native demand for education.
Local Syrians were most interested in learning Western languages, mathematics, and
bookkeeping, which the growing number of French (Catholic) and Russian (Orthodox)
schools in Syria provided.176  Jessup and the other missionaries hoped, as seen in Jessup’s
article requesting funds in 1861, to both increase the size of the mission and prevent local
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students from going to Catholic or Orthodox schools.  The opportunity to solve this
problem of educational philosophy, aggravated by the lack of funds in the 1860s, came in
1866 as Anderson’s time Secretary of the American Board ended and the plans for the
Syrian Protestant College were laid.177  The Syrian Protestant College was conceived
(beginning in 1862 shortly after the end of the Syrian civil war) as an educational
institution not under the direct control of the American Board, or its follower from 1870
the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church.178  This new institution would
train students for various (other than religious) career paths and would at the same time
provide the first opportunity for higher education in Beirut, something the Catholics
could not yet offer.179  The competing Jesuit university, St. Joseph, was founded eight
years later in 1874.180  Because they sought funds from outside sources including many
British donors, the College could function with more autonomy, even though its
directors, including Jessup, were members of the American mission.  As had occurred in
the past with other issues, the missionaries in Syria found a way to compromise the ideals
of the mission board with their practical needs on the ground in Syria.
This change in philosophy was not only based on the pragmatic need to compete
for students in Syria, it also was related to a shift in missionary thinking about the role of
politics.  This shift did not mean that Anderson’s policies were abandoned however.
Anderson’s anti-civilizational policy did not die out after his retirement in 1866; his
successor Nathaniel Clark “scrupulously followed” Anderson’s ideology.181  Anderson’s
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thinking also affected the nature of the Syrian Protestant College because it maintained
an evangelical focus with teaching in Arabic.182  This ideology would remain an
important part of the thinking of Henry Jessup, secretary of the American mission from
the 1870s.  Jessup at times, especially when pressed with opposition from the Ottoman
government in the 1880s as will be seen in chapter four, clung to the original and ultimate
goal of the mission: to instill the Protestant gospel into all of the mission’s efforts in order
to reach Syrian Christians so that they eventually might lead the Muslims and Jews of
Syria to the gospel as well.  How this process was worked out in reality is another
question; the mission that Jessup oversaw gradually became an institution that employed
both a civilizational and anti-civilizational approach to missions, depending on the
circumstances.
Despite the continuity of the anti-civilizational approach, as Ussama Makdisi has
argued effectively, the chaos of the 1860 war in Syria left a lasting impression on the
missionaries in Syria that caused them to lean more towards a political vision of their
future work in Syria.  After 1860, the “tide, however, had turned irreversibly” and they
were “now willing to take the side of a secular European power.”183  The Syrian
Protestant College was one of the main examples of this turn toward a civilizational
approach; it was designed to “engage directly with worldly and secular affairs.”184
Furthermore, even though the College started in the 1860s teaching in Arabic, by the
1880s the College had begun “teaching secular sciences in English, which the
missionaries recognized was the language of modernity.”185
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But this new hope in politics was not supportive of any European intervention;
Jessup only approved of greater European political control in the Ottoman Empire if it
would benefit the work of the mission.  As described above, in the midst of the 1860 war
in Syria, Jessup approved of European intervention for the immediate needs of the
time—the protection of American missionaries and Syrian Christians who were both in
serious danger.186  But Jessup had no interest in long-term Russian or French control in
Syria because this would have limited their efforts at Protestant missions.187  While the
Ottoman government might offer certain legal restrictions and encumbrances to the
American mission, Jessup did not desire the downfall of the Ottoman Empire to the
extent that he would have rather seen a Catholic or Orthodox power controlling Syria.
Again during the period after the 1860 war, the Ottoman Empire was not as pressing a
threat to Jessup as that presented by Catholicism or Orthodoxy.
However, Jessup reacted much more positively to the possibility of British
protection of regions of the Ottoman Empire because he hoped that bring greater
possibilities for American Protestant mission work.  Jessup saw this as a concrete
possibility only after the Cyprus Convention of 1878-1879, where the Ottomans had
ceded control of Cyprus to the British in return for British protection against the
Russians.  Jessup saw this as a concrete sign of future British protection of throughout the
Ottoman Empire.  It was in the context of this political agreement that Jessup wrote The
Mohammedan Missionary Problem, published in 1879.  This book, Jessup’s second
major work following the 1874 Syrian Home Life, described why the time was ripe for
the conversion of Muslims to Christianity in the Ottoman Empire and what the positive
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and negative factors were for that conversion.  The introduction describes how God has
ordained this exact time for the conversion of Muslims, the first chapter describes the
“unfavorable features” of Muslim conversion (criticisms of Islam), the second chapter
describes the “favorable points” of Muslim conversion (areas of agreement with Islam),
and the third chapter describes the “Probable effects of the British Protectorate over
Asiatic Turkey” (Jessup’s hopes after the Cyprus Convention).188  Jessup concludes with
the idealistic and racially-charged hope that “the two great branches of the Christianized
Anglo-Saxon race [could] go hand in hand to the great work assigned us in the
evangelization of the Mohammedan world.”189
Jessup’s language throughout the book certainly validates criticism of his writing.
Jessup interchangeably uses the terms “Mohammedan,” “Moslem,” “Islamic,”
“Ishmaelite,” and “Eastern” throughout the book.  This terminology, despite Jessup’s
experience in the Muslim world, demonstrates the pervasiveness of American
Orientalism,190 which Jessup contributed to with his writing.  However, despite the many
instances in the book of “unstructured, situational personal events, often derivative of
some chance occurrence attributed to others, [becoming] the basis for reconfirming a
generalized image or misrepresentation,” Jessup’s criticism does not extend in the same
way to the Ottoman Empire.191  Because Jessup is “not writing from the political
standpoint, but only from the position of students of the divine providence,” he focuses
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on broader conceptions of Christian versus Muslim civilization.192  The Ottoman Empire
is for Jessup a major political representation of Islamic civilization, but Jessup does not
portray the Ottoman authorities as acting directly against missionary efforts.  Of course,
Jessup hopes that British control would mean the possibility for Muslims to convert to
Christianity without repercussions and the prevention of events like the war of 1860
where many Christians were killed.193  But most of Jessup’s hopes for the future of an
Ottoman Empire under British control concern better conditions overall for the people of
the Empire such as the end of tax farming, the curbing of disruptive nomadic tribes,
greater religious equality, freedom of the press, better education (although he positively
describes the efforts of Midhat Pasha), and a reconstruction of the judiciary.194  Jessup’s
The Mohammedan Missionary Problem reflects his hopes at one point in time for the
benefits British political intervention in the context of the Cyprus Convention; by 1885,
Jessup turned his attention directly to the Ottoman authorities who before had remained a
secondary concern to his goals for the American mission.
Encroachment of other Foreign Missions
The obstacle to American missions in Syria that most bothered the Presbyterians
and Congregationalists that made up the mission was the competing influence of other
foreign missions, especially Catholic and Orthodox missions.  Henry Jessup’s writing,
especially in the Foreign Missionary, demonstrates this defensive reaction based on the
impression that Catholic missionary efforts in Syria acted in direct response to their
efforts.  Americans Protestants during the nineteenth century, either in the mission field
or at home in the United States, did not have good relations with Catholics.  One example
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of this in the United States is the fight over the nature of public schools.  The prevailing
model for public schools in the United States was essentially a Protestant one; for
example, the King James Version Bibles used in schools did not include the
apocrypha.195  Other texts used in school frequently used the pejorative term “Popery” to
describe Catholicism.196  At this period in American history, Catholicism was associated
with foreign and un-American sentiments, even though by 1850 they were the largest
single religious denomination in the United States.197  Worldwide Catholic-Protestant
relations also were not cordial.  The missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, in Syria
demonstrated these hostilities in their work there.
Even though French Catholics had a historical connection with the Maronite and
other Uniate churches in Syria and the Middle East, this connection was mainly
ecclesiastical until later in the nineteen century;198 the early to mid-nineteenth century
was a “low point” for Catholic missions in Syria.199  Having only begun the modern
mission to Syria in 1831 as a response to the threat of Protestant missions, the Jesuits (the
largest of several Catholic groups in Syria) believed it was “necessary to consolidate
churches [especially Uniate churches] threatened by Protestants.”200  The American
mission correctly saw the Jesuits especially, but also Catholic missions overall, as the
largest threat to their efforts with local Syrian Christians.201  English, Scottish, German,
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Italian, and Russian missions also grew in the period after 1860.202  For example, were it
not for the interruptions that Russian wars with the Ottoman Empire caused, more
situations like that of Nazareth in 1876 might have occurred: the Protestant school there
had to be closed due to the fact that the Russian-backed orthodox school attracted all of
the local Orthodox students.203  Russian efforts also found success because of the struggle
between the Arabic speaking laity and the Greek-speaking church hierarchy.  The
Russian goal was first to “support ad maintain Orthodoxy  in the Holy Land, that was, to
preserve the Arabs in their faith,” which clashed with the Greek hierarchy’s hold on the
Eastern Orthodox Church.204  The Greek hierarchy saw Russian efforts as “an attempt to
wean them [Arab Orthodox Christians] away from” their authority.205
  Despite the competition from many different foreign groups, the most prominent
for he Americans was always the “Jesuits,” the name given by the Americans to all
Catholic missions.206  This presentation of competition to the mission is similar to the
way that Jessup and other missionaries often described Muslims in the Syria—all as one
group of “Mohammedans.”  Americans recognized correctly, however, that the real
Jesuits acted in direct opposition to their work; the main example of this was the creation
of the University of St. Joseph in 1874-75 after the foundation of the Syrian Protestant
College in 1866.207  This was confirmation of the fact that the Jesuits in Syria were “fired
by a spirit of opposition to the Protestant mission.”208  Especially after 1860, this
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competition increased, but even as early as 1845, the American mission was aware of the
growth of Catholic missions.209  Due to the fact that, even by American accounts,
Catholic schools provided “a wider liberal education” that was attractive to local
students,210 Catholic missions began to seriously threaten the growth of American
mission schools after 1860.  The Americans felt particularly threatened because the
Catholics were reaching out to more than just the local Catholic communities.211  Led by
French Catholic supported missions, the American mission now was small in comparison
the various educational efforts of the many the schools of rival foreign groups such as the
French or British (in 1869 at least forty-five in Beirut alone) as well as the many local
Christian and Muslim schools.212
Despite Catholic denials, Jessup pointed out continually that Catholic missions
were growing, threatening Protestant missions, and acting in direct opposition to
American efforts.  While Jessup may have been accurate in his descriptions of Jesuit
efforts, he also exaggerated Catholic efforts and continued to misuse the term Jesuit.
Through the decade after the 1860 war and up to the turnover of the mission to the
Presbyterian Board in 1870, Jessup continually recounts instances of Jesuit actions
against the mission.  For example, in Jessup’s 1861 appeal for funds cited above, he
describes how the Americans were caring for orphans from the 1860 war: “there are
Protestants, Greeks, Maronites, and Greek Catholics; and if they leave our instruction, the
Jesuits stand ready, like ravening wolves, to seize upon them. . .shall we give them
                                                 





up?”213  Later, in 1864 Jessup explains how the Jesuits “published a book against
Mohammedanism, of the most abusive character” that Jessup believed was calculated to
“provoke the Government to a rigid censorship of all the printing presses in Syria, and
thus to fetter the Protestant press; as the amount of printing done by the Jesuits is but
trifling.”214  A year later, Jessup relayed the story of a Protestant convert who had his
daughter taken from him by the Maronite authorities and placed in the custody of the
“Papal Sisters of Charity” in Beirut.215  Despite the fact that he just described the
Maronites and the Sisters of Charity as the parties involved, Jessup still questioned
whether “the French consulate in Syria, so long identified with the Papacy here, will be
willing or able to remove a Protestant child from that labyrinth of Jesuitism.”216  Besides
supporting local Christians against Protestant efforts, Jessup also blamed the Jesuits in
1870 for printing “a book attacking Protestantism and the missionaries in the most
virulent and obscene language, so that all respectable men of the Maronite and Greek
Catholic sects disown and repudiate the book.”217  Finally, in 1870, Jessup frames his
disagreement with the Catholics in global terms: “the Jesuits here are working with
sleepless vigilance, to force the native Syrian Catholic sects to the acceptance of the
decrees of the Council218. . . the only result thus far in Syria, is to unite the Maronites and
the Greek Catholics against the dogma of infallibility.”219  Jessup displays an obvious
bias against the foreign Catholics in Syria who, for him, can only do good
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unintentionally.  This competition against French efforts in Syria was only beginning in
the period from 1860 to 1885; French initiatives in Syria would only grow in importance
up to World War I, after which they justified their takeover of the Syrian mandate with
their widespread network of schools and other social services there.
Jessup does also briefly mention difficulties with other foreign missions, but these
accounts are not as frequent or harsh as those against the Jesuits.  Due to the fact that the
conflict with Catholicism was historical, present in America, and present in Syria,
American missionaries and the Jesuits carried on a longstanding dispute there different in
character than those that Jessup mentions with other foreign missions.  Even other
Protestant missions could be the targets of disapproval for Jessup based on their
“religious tone” being “not the most satisfactory,” although not to the degree of the
Jesuits.220  Jessup worried that “English and Prussian educational and religious
enterprises are constantly increasing. . . it seems as though education would be taken out
of our hands ere long.”221  Jessup at other times praised other Protestant efforts in Syria,
such as “Prussian deaconesses” in Homs.222  In the pages of the Missionary Herald,
Jessup did not mention the incursion of Russian backed Orthodox schooling in Syria
because most Russian efforts were farther south such as in Jerusalem, although other
Protestant missionaries connected with the Syria mission did complain about their
influence.223  Jessup, from his location in Beirut was constantly most worried about Jesuit
influence, although problems with local Christians were at least as troublesome for
Jessup.
                                                 





Rejection from local Eastern Christians
As had been the case up to 1860, the American missionaries faced a stern
challenge from local Christians who did not share the Americans belief that they required
“reforming.”  Their Priests and other clergy figures especially did not welcome American
efforts, even though children of the various Eastern Christian groups in Syria did attend
American schools.  Eastern Christian opposition to American efforts could also be
particularly troubling for the American mission because complaints from Syrian
Christians to local and higher Ottoman authorities carried weight; the government
officials wanted to maintain the status quo especially after the chaos of 1860.  In the
period after 1860, the situation became even more difficult for the Americans because,
while they were attempting to rebuild their own school system, local Christian education
also expanded.  For example in Beirut, the Greek Orthodox had a high school from 1854,
the Maronites began a local high schools in 1861, the Greek Catholics began theirs in
1866, and Butrus al-Bustani’s school for all sects began in 1863.224
Jessup’s writing in both the Foreign Missionary and in his first major work Syrian
Home Life (1874) demonstrates the various American frustrations with local Christians,
whom he saw as their natural “sphere of influence”.  In 1862, Jessup recounted how the
new governor of Mt. Lebanon, Daoud Pasha, was a “bigoted papist” who “surrounded
himself with those who are the most bitter enemies of the Protestant religion” and made
efforts to return a building in Ain Zehalta to the Greek Catholic community even though
the Protestants had been using it.225  Later that year, Jessup described a movement toward
Protestantism among the Greek Orthodox of Homs which the “Greek Priests, having
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exhausted all their own means of persecution, had had recourse to the Moslems of the
baser sort, telling them that these Protestants are freemasons, or worshipers of the sun,
who deny the existence of God; hoping thus to stir up persecution against them among
the fanatical.”226  Following up on the story in Homs later in the year, Jessup recounts
how the Protestants there had remained firm and persecution from the “wicked Priests
who had anticipated the utter overthrow of Protestantism” had increased: they were
“deprived of business,” “threatened with death,” and “stoned and railed upon in the
streets.”227  Jessup also picked out the persecution of native Protestants by the Maronite
clergy; in 1865 he described how a native Protestant near Beirut refused to pay an
indulgence to the “notorious Maronite Bishop Tobia” and had his wife and daughter
taken from him as a result.228  In each case, Jessup focused his malcontent against the
clergy of each local Church, but whatever vitriol Jessup displayed writing for the Foreign
Missionary was only magnified in his first full length book, Syrian Home Life (1874).
For the purposes Syrian Home Life, Jessup’s description of both Syrian Christians
and Muslims is extremely negative, essentialist, and anecdotal.  The book is a collection
of stories from Jessup’s time in Syria up to 1874 that focuses on stories that exalt the
American mission and situate Catholics, Muslims, and Syrian Christians as the “other.”
He seems to have gone back through the stories from his first twenty years in Syria that
he wrote for the Missionary Herald and embellished them to make them even more
ridiculous and Orientalist than in their original telling.  Jessup continues in this book to
use Western stereotypical language such as his description of the new Pasha of Damascus
after the war of 1860: “this Mohammedan Pasha behaved himself while Fuad Pasha was
                                                 




present. . .but he was a Turk, and soon proved his nationality.”229  But whatever
condemnation Jessup has for Muslims, he reserves his worst for the local Christian
Priests and the bulk for Syrian Christians.  Jessup selects various negative stories about
Priests with the conclusion, “as donkeys have a world-wide reputation for stupidity, it is
eminently proper to set the Syrian Priests next in order, for, with rare exceptions, they are
marvels of ignorance.”230  This sort of caricaturist writing characterizes this book, which
was actually a collection of Jessup’s writings up to that point in Syria.  As discussed
above, Jessup had not abandoned the Orientalist language by the time of the composition
of his next book, The Mohammedan Missionary Problem, but Jessup does make more of
an attempt in his second book to avoid stereotypical judgments based on embellished
stories.
Whatever the exact tone, it is difficult to find examples of Jessup making a
positive reference to the clergy of any of the local Eastern Christian groups.  Jessup’s
strong reaction was based on the difficulty that the American mission had in bringing
these groups into the Protestant fold.  The difficulties Jessup expresses, however, mainly
concern adult local Christians who are attempting to or have joined the Protestant
denomination.  In one key area, to be discussed below, the American mission had good
success in reaching the local Christians—through education of their children in American
schools.
On Islam and the Ottoman authorities
There were, of course, also examples of American missionary difficulties with the
Ottoman authorities.  First, missionaries complained about the Ottoman authorities when
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they intervened in local disputes.  Jessup complained in 1862 of the influence that Greek
Catholics had on the Ottoman authorities: “the Priests and monks control the
Government, and use the Turkish soldiers to carry out their infamous designs.”231  Jessup
is primarily concerned about the influence of local Christian clergy, and the Ottomans
(while probably not acting exactly as Jessup describes) were interested in maintaining
peace among the millets.  When it came to a Muslim converting to Christianity, however,
the situation was different.  Although Jessup admits that he is unclear on the true details,
he suggests that the Ottoman authorities had put a certain Damascus Muslim who had
converted to Protestantism through “every kind of abuse and insult” including dragging
him “through the streets, his hands in wooden stocks, an object of contempt, and a
warning to all Mohammedans.”232  Interestingly, Jessup mentions no negative
consequence on the mission for such an isolated instance of a Muslim converting to
Protestantism, which makes the reader wonder if the story was largely a fiction designed
to instill interest in the American readers.  Even in Jessup’s highly polemical 1874 Syrian
Home Life, Jessup describes the Ottoman laissez faire stance on American missions: the
“Turkish Empire [has] just strength enough still to extend leveling law over its wrangling
Christian sects, to the prevention of intolerance; and with weakness enough to allow
Christian missionaries free access even to its Mohammedan population, and, nominally at
least, to allow entire religious freedom to its 35,000,000 subjects.”233  A decade later,
Jessup would be writing much differently about the Ottomans.
Secondly, the missionaries complained between 1860 and 1885 about Ottoman
censorship of the press.  Even though British missionaries throughout the Ottoman
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Empire were actually the more pejorative in their daring to publish polemics against
Islam even in Istanbul,234 the Americans felt that they were unjustly characterized as
being the same as the English missionaries.235  Ali Pasha, in response to an English
publication, issued a letter to the British authorities arguing against any preaching of
“systematic propaganda” in the Empire due to its tendency to exploit people based on
their needs and to misrepresent other religions.236  Ali Pasha skillfully composed the
document in such a way as to contextualize Ottoman strictures against missionary efforts
that crossed the line into “systematic propaganda” through a comparison with similar
European laws as well as British laws against Protestant proselytism in India.  In all three
of these cases, Ali Pasha argued, the primary concern was the “danger of arousing
religious and racial passions in a multi-religious and multi-racial state with incalculable
consequences.”237  Based on this policy, the Ottoman authorities maintained strict
censorship of all publications in the Empire, not just those of missionaries.  The
Americans did in fact remain more cautious than the British: only one American
missionary was reprimanded and the Americans refused to publish some polemical
British missionary documents.238  On the whole, the relationship between the Ottomans
and the American missionaries up to 1885 was casual and even liberal, especially because
the Americans were cautious and did not loudly proclaim what little work they might
have done with Muslims.239  For example, the Syrian Protestant College, although it did
not register as it should have as a private institution after the 1869 Ottoman education law
                                                 




238 Ibid., 177, 222.
239 Ibid., 219.
79
was passed, it was still allowed to function tax-free as a charitable institution.240
Beginning in the 1880s, however, Jessup would find himself in a nearly decade-long
struggle with the Ottomans due to their efforts against American missionary schools, the
centerpiece of American missions in Syria.
Overall, the nature of these conflicts is distant; the Ottomans in this period are
mainly an authority from a distance who at times steps in to deal with local conflicts.
Often, local Christians or Muslims would appeal to the Ottoman authorities for
intervention when the Protestants disrupted their local affairs.  Even though Fuad Pasha
and the Ottomans hoped to use the aftermath of the 1860 war to impose stricter Ottoman
imperial rule in Syria, the Ottoman central authorities did not accomplish this until the
time period of the 1885 controversy during the reign of Abdul Hamid II.
Jessup’s accounts also are not clear on whether the Ottoman intervention is from
local Ottoman officials or from Istanbul.  What is clear, however, is Jessup’s continual
use of the “Turks” or the “Turkish authorities” instead of Ottomans and “Constantinople”
for Istanbul.  Here again, Jessup’s language in publications for home consumption
represents both his own prejudices as well as an impact on the American public that
maintains stereotypes.  The same is true of the other groups about which Jessup writes
including the Jesuits and Syrian Christians.  It is the conflicts with these two groups in
addition to the internal problems of the mission that most occupied Jessup during the
years leading up to the 1885 controversy.
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Note on the expansion of American mission schools
Amidst all of the aforementioned difficulties, American schools multiplied during
this time period.  This is somewhat remarkable, even to the point that the main historian
of the American mission has few answers for the increase.241  Even though Jessup’s
writing contains frequent references to persecution and struggles with various groups and
authorities in Syria, his writing also contains many references to the growth of the
mission in the years between 1860 and 1885.  For example, in The Mohammedan
Missionary Problem (1879) Jessup describes how American schools “have stimulated
other sects and communities to found schools of their own, so that the work of popular
education is advancing with great rapidity.”242  Jessup also denotes the specifics of the
growth of the mission from nothing in 1860 to “hundreds of common schools, five
colleges, nearly a dozen female seminaries, six theological seminaries and a medical
college” by 1879.243  According to Shahin Makarius’ report in al-Muqtataf in 1882, there
were more “evangelical” (mostly American) schools in Beirut (3,121) than any other type
of school.244
Further complicating this growth was the increase in the Ottoman state
educational plan.  The Ottomans, as far back as 1845 when a state system of education
was first recommended, recognized the benefits of education and its particular
importance as a means to keep Western influence out of the Empire.245  However, the
1869 “Comprehensive Law of Reorganization” provided the real boost for Ottoman
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education in this period.246  This law divided Ottoman schooling into five levels, where
the lower three would ideally be provided throughout the Empire and the higher two
ideally in the provincial capitals.  This law also made it more possible for non-Muslims to
go to state schools and required private schools to register and provide proof of teacher’s
diplomas.  Ultimately, this law would not be effectively enforced, especially in the
provinces farther from Istanbul, until the 1880s under Abdul Hamid II.
So why did American mission schools grow over this twenty-five year period?
Five reasons are apparent.  First, the indirect system of administering primary schools
functioned very well as a compromise system because native teachers were less likely to
be disliked by Syrian parents.247  Second, the Syrian Protestant College was successful.
The common schools throughout Syria and the five missionary stations of Beirut, ‘Abeih,
Tripoli, Sidon, and Zahleh, functioned as a feeder system toward the SPC, which was in
high demand for its curriculum including multiple Western languages and technical
training in Arabic.248   Third, the Americans were able to ameliorate relations with the
Greek Orthodox community to some extent, so Orthodox Priests were less likely to
anathematize relations with Protestants.249  Fourth, after the transfer of the Syria mission
to the Presbyterian Board in 1870, there was a short-lived increase in funds, so that for
three years it was the third highest funded mission after India and China.250  Finally, after
these funds dried up, the mission was able to procure increased funds from private
donors, perhaps due to the notoriety of the Syrian Protestant College.251  Through a
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combination of these factors and the divisiveness of the competing missions, by 1885 the
American mission was the single most formidable mission in Syria as well as the most
widespread.
Conclusion
Only by the 1880s had the American built back up enough after the chaos of the
1860 war to feel capable of challenging the Ottomans or for the Ottomans to bother with
American schools.  In the 1860s and 1870s, the Americans challenged the local
community schools and schools backed by non-Protestant foreign powers because these
did not have the sovereign and concrete authority of the Ottomans.  Against these non-
state opponents, the mission grew and its schools multiplied.  The combination of this
increased missionary presence, the changes in Ottoman policy beginning in the early
1880s, and the expansion of other foreign and local schools at the same time, created the
perfect storm of competition leading to conflict.  The school closings of 1885 became the
tipping point for a controversy that had been quietly building from 1860 to 1885 but
finally occurred based on all of these new or expanded factors.  The American mission
had never faced such direct opposition from the Ottoman authorities in Syria, especially
not towards its schools.  Jessup interpreted this opposition as the major threat to the
mission.  This fear precipitated a major campaign to garner Western diplomatic and
Protestant public support for the fight against the new Ottoman policies.  As Jessup had
done prior to 1885, he turned to the pen as his best means by which to shape others’
opinions about the situation of the American mission in Syria.  Jessup initiated a new
campaign of language that focused on the oppression from the Ottoman government and
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its handmaiden of Islam that was different from the language of the controversies of the
past twenty-five years.
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Chapter IV: The 1885 School Controversy in Context
Introduction
The school controversy that began in April of 1885 was a watershed in the history
of the American Presbyterian mission to Syria.  The context surrounding the mission was
different from, although comparable to, that of the previous twenty-five years.  Before
1885, the American mission, according to Jessup, faced difficulties from the Ottoman
government, but its chief opponents in Syria (in both their perception and in reality) were
unreceptive Eastern Christians and French and Russian religious initiatives in the region.
Jessup’s rhetoric after 1885 should be read not as a characteristic polemic against Islam
but rather as a response to the hostile reality of the context of the 1880s where Islam was
increasingly used by the Ottoman government for political reasons.252  The Ottoman
government of Abdul Hamid II began a major reform effort in the 1880s that was a direct
response to their perceived threat of competition over influence of Ottoman subjects, of
which the American mission was the primary example for both the provincial authorities
in Syria and the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul.  After a lengthy period of liberalizing
reforms in the Tanzimat era in which Jessup had grown accustomed to an Ottoman
Empire that did not bother the American mission significantly, Abdul Hamid attempted
to reassert a program that brought Islam directly into politics.  Jessup took a position
where he felt that he had just as much right as the Ottoman political authorities to
influence the people of Syria.  Both sides were willing to employ various types of
initiatives to maintain or strengthen their hold.  As a result, Jessup’s rhetoric took on a
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defensive tone, now heightened against the Ottoman government and Islam, which had
only sparsely been seen in the past because the larger threats to the American mission
came from groups other than the Hamidian Ottoman authorities.  The Ottomans presented
a new challenge for Jessup and the American mission because the Ottomans had the
power to enforce closure of American schools.  In fact, when compared with Ottoman
writing in the same context of the 1880s, Jessup’s writing shares many similarities that
suggest a larger climate of competition among various groups, including the Jesuits,
Russians, and local Muslims and Christians, for influence over Ottoman subjects in Syria.
This competition was the most fervent in the area of education as it served a needed
purpose and was a useful means of gaining long-term influence in Syria.  All of the
groups involved in this competition saw education as the most important factor; and at
the same time, each group did not separate the various means by which their educational
missions could be supported.  Jessup’s writings surrounding the 1885 controversy over
schooling, similar to the period from 1860 to 1885, again reflect the reality that both
missionary perceptions and historical reality were influential in shaping missionary
response.  Overall, a close reading of Jessup’s writing surrounding the 1885 school
controversy, in comparison with Ottoman sources and in the context of heightened
educational competition, demonstrates that Jessup had a clear understanding of the
current situation of the American mission.  Jessup accurately saw the future influence of
the American mission in Syria as being in serious jeopardy.
Of course, Jessup’s writing does display many instances of “Protestant
Orientalism,” as Samir Khalaf has dubbed it, as well as specific anti-Islamic aspersions,
as has been seen especially in published sources like The Mohammedan Missionary
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Problem and Syrian Home Life.  Jessup, like any other American missionary to the
Muslim world, came to the mission field with certain preconceived notions about the
Ottoman Empire and Islam based on the context discussed in the second chapter of the
paper.  But at the same time, readings of Henry Jessup and other American missionaries
that do not also highlight the historical and rhetorical context are inherently flawed.
Arguing especially against Samir Khalaf’s ahistorical notion that “one only has to skim
through the writings of Jessup. . . to realize how inflexible and prejudiced [he was],”253 it
is only through the context of the specific time period, comparison and contrast with
other missionary writing in other specific circumstances, and through a detailed and
longitudinal study that missionary texts can be interpreted.
Ottoman Policy Changes in the 1880s
Having had several years to consolidate his position in Istanbul after the brief
constitutional attempt in 1876, Abdul Hamid II began in the 1880s to implement a
program that would attempt to solidify the Empire internally so as to defend the Empire
externally.  He recognized that the Empire under his rule had grown increasingly
fractious due to various nationalist movements by minority groups.  Even though this was
not a new perspective, he also believed that the Great Powers of Europe had become a
threat to the Empire that could not be ignored, especially after the 1878-79 Cyprus
Convention, the Russian incursions at the same time, and the 1882 British takeover of
Egypt.  In order to bring about these reforms, Abdul Hamid attempted to impose
centralization and consolidation, especially in the more far-reaching regions of the
Empire such as Syria and Transjordan.  Part of this program involved creating a new
                                                 
253 Khalaf, 124.
87
Ottoman identity that would bring solidarity and impose discipline across the Empire
through the use of Islam.254  This was a tenuous project because Hamidian policy makers
also hoped to put forth the program of Ottomanism that would appeal to Ottoman
subjects across confessions.255
Abdul Hamid II’s reforms were designed to tackle both the internal and external
threats to the Empire at the same time, and Henry Jessup and the American Presbyterian
missionaries were at the crux of these two policies.  In the eyes of the Ottoman
government, American missionary education presented the largest threat because it was
the largest and oldest manifestation of all of the Western Christian missions in the field of
modern education and the founding mission of Robert College and the Syrian Protestant
College.256   Furthermore, American missionary education was indirectly and/or directly
especially responsible for the increasing solidarity and demands of various Christian
millet groups in the Empire as well as the growing threat of takeover by one of the Great
Powers.257  The threat of what Grand Vezir Kamil Pasha called in 1889 “treasonable
doctrines” being propagated in the American missionary schools was imminent in the
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mind of Ottoman officials.258  Just as the American mission under Jessup saw schooling
as its primary field of work, the Ottomans also saw education as the most important
segment of their plan of response.  Demand for education was high, and schools were the
“most direct means to win the minds of local people to their faith.”259  The people
throughout the Empire recognized this new educational focus; the Ottoman rash of new
school construction beginning in 1884 and the program of public morality tied up with
this provided the “most visible impression of the changes the state was effecting in the
Empire.”260
Policies to promote centralization and consolidation
The Ottoman program for centralization and consolidation began in earnest in the
early 1880s once Abdul Hamid II’s power had been consolidated.  Scholars have
generally argued that after the constitutional attempt of 1876 had been pushed aside by
Abdul Hamid in favor of a return to a more autocratic rulership, the Tanzimat period of
reform came to an end.261  More recent research has called this idea into question.  The
Hamidian period saw many reforms, some of which were enacted before his time as
Sultan but only carried out under his authority.  However, as Benjamin Fortna has
pointed out, the Islamic element of many of Abdul Hamid’s policies suggests rather an
appropriation of past legislation for new purposes.262  In general, the Hamidian regime
attempted to bring under control different elements of Ottoman governance and society
and to extend its influence more concretely to parts of the Empire farther away from
                                                 
258 PHS archives, Box 8, Folder 9.  Letter of April 27, 1889 from Strauss (American legation in Istanbul) to
Pringle.  This point will be discussed at length later in this chapter.
259 Rogan, 136.
260 Fortna, 115.
261 For discussion of the broader context of these reforms see Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman
Empire and Moshe Maoz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine.
262 For example see Fortna, 60, 93-95.
89
Istanbul.263   In order to foster a wider reach for Istanbul that would build up the Empire
from within, efforts were made to improve the enactment of taxation, censorship,264 and
especially education policy.  Other efforts included the redistribution of territories, such
as the creation of the province of Beirut in 1888.265  New and more efficient governors
were also sent to the provinces to make sure that these developments were carried out.266
This program of centralization also included modern improvements to railroads, the
military, irrigation, and industry.267  This process certainly did not always go smoothly,
but it was pursued with the hope of preserving the Empire.
As mentioned previously, Syria was a particular target for the Hamidian reforms
because it was in reality and also represented a location of incredible confessional
diversity, confessional conflict, foreign power intrusion, suspect loyalty, dangerous
ideologies, and non-state run education.  In addition, the large number of thriving printing
presses compounded this threat: all of these dangers to state authority could be exported
to other regions of the Empire effectively.268  This is reflected by the statistics of
missionary schools that show a particularly high concentration there,269 the many
complaints from Ottoman officials in the province,270 and the Ottoman response that
included chiefly the creation of the new province administered from its capital in
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Beirut.271  The new provincial capital of Beirut provided the Ottomans with a means to
“maintain a closer scrutiny” of the region that was full of foreign influences, along with
all the other factors mentioned above.272
Policies to promote Ottoman Legitimacy through the use of Islam
Sultan Abdul Hamid II, faced with the internal and external threats mentioned
above, hoped to cultivate a system of rule where Islam could be used to foster increased
legitimacy and increased loyalty to Ottoman central authority.  The Hamidian
administration saw Islam as a convenient instrument to propagate imperial authority
because it had applicability across ethnic boundaries throughout the large and diverse
Empire.   In addition, Islam provided a strong historical concept of power that could be
used to ensure success in their project of the strengthening of imperial control in the
outlying regions of the Empire.  This process was necessary for the Hamidian
administration because “just as the state was permeating levels of society it had never
reached before, making unprecedented demands on its people, it created new strains on
society” that would require the increased security of Islamic legitimacy.273  This was a
multifaceted campaign that had many applications; the Ottomans saw education as the
prime means by which to inculcate this new ideology.  As a result, the efforts of the
American mission in Syria, especially its wide educational reach, were in direct
opposition to this new implementation of an “official faith” that sought to use “Islamic
vocabulary and ideological tools” to simultaneously root out opposing viewpoints and
implement their own.274






Ottoman Perceptions of Missionaries
As Abdul Hamid formulated this Islamic policy in the 1880s, one of the first tasks
was to gather information about the missionary institutions within their domains.
Because up to the 1880s missionary institutions had largely been left alone due to their
satisfying a need for “neglected social services” that the Ottomans were not equipped to
fulfill,275 the question of the extent and nature of missionary influence was a new one for
the Ottomans.276  Munif Pasha, the Ottoman education minister, issued a memorandum in
1886 concerning non-Muslim schools in the Empire that described how “the Ottoman
state had no knowledge of what transpired in these institutions.”277  More specifically, the
Porte was “completely in the dark about curricula, textbooks, and moral character and
behavior of the teachers in its non-Muslim schools.”278  Interestingly, the memorandum
was issued after the Ottomans had already closed as many as thirty-three American
mission schools in Syria, as Jessup described in the Memorial of Missionaries.  This
demonstrates that the Ottomans certainly knew something in the general sense about the
negative impact of mission education, and this knowledge was based first and foremost
on complaints from the provinces.
Local officials were in the unique position to see the influence of mission schools,
particularly if the town or village under their control did not have any modern alternative
to missionary education.  For example, the Ottoman governor of Syria, Reshid Nashid
Pasha, wrote to Istanbul in 1887 concerning education funding and the threat of
American (listed first) and other missionaries in Syria:






[The Missionaries] are educating Muslim and Christian children gratis
and seducing and convincing the children of those who do not send their
children to their schools by any means available and are corrupting the
subjects’ upbringing.  In spite of this, so far no schools have been built by
the [Ottoman] state as is necessary to be beneficial and to compete with
them.279
Many other calls from the provinces similar to this one made their way to Istanbul in the
1880s.  Even where some progress had been made in the cities, the situation was still
desperate in the rural areas, as Ali Pasha the governor of Beirut argued:
Coming to the districts appended to Beirut, there are many foreign schools
in the Nusayri areas to the north and Latakia and Tripoli and in other
provinces.  Many students are being educated in them and since there are
no [Ottoman state] schools in those areas apart from the rushdiye
[advanced primary] and ibtidai [new elementary] schools in the
aforementioned places [Beirut proper], the children of these areas are all
growing up with foreign education and consequently, foreign influence is
easily increasing day by day.280
These fears were based on scattered accounts of Muslim children desiring to convert to
Protestantism and Eastern Christian youths holding decidedly Western modes of thought,
or in short, that the hearts and minds of the Ottoman subjects in the region were being
corrupted by missionary influence.
The Ottomans took these warnings seriously, both in order to satisfy the demands
of their constituency but also because they recognized the larger negative possibilities
from missionary influence.  Calls from the provinces began at least as early as 1880.
Already by 1881, a memorandum from the Ministry of Public Education recognized the
need to speed up the process of enforcing the laws of the already existing 1869 law that
provided a legal framework to close private schools in the Empire unless they had the




proper documentation.281  One of the steps in this process was to create local educational
councils with the authority to regulate private schools and manage state civil schools;
Syria was the only one of the councils prepared by 1883 that was not in Anatolia.282
There was a strong presence of local Muslim religious notables on these councils,
although it is unclear if they were entirely made up of Muslims.283  For example, out of
the required fourteen members of the educational councils,284 seven of them were
ulama.285  The head of the council was Muhammad Hamzazade, the Hanafi mufti of
Damascus,286 four were also accredited to teach in local religious schools, and two held
high positions in the Ottoman court system.287  The participation of Muslim notables in
Ottoman state educational initiatives further supports the “normal and regular flow
between the religious, the judicial, and the civil worlds.”288
Based on the lack of information that the Ottomans had and the example of the
Syrian Protestant College not registering under the 1869 law,289 it is clear that this law
had not been acted upon in the decade since its inception.  Throughout this scramble in
the early 1880s to formulate a response to missionary efforts in the Empire, the
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authorities in Istanbul also hoped to maintain the image that they could provide the
needed recipe for success.  Similar to the missionary conception of their work in Syria,
“in the late Ottoman period the disparity between the pessimism over present
circumstances and the optimism for the future speaks to the tremendous hope that state
officials placed on education.”290
Ottoman Response
Having prepared a plan of action in response to the growing trend of complaints
from the provinces, the Ottomans acted both retroactively in opposition to already-
established missionary efforts as well as proactively to subvert any demand for them in
the future.  This program was also multifaceted in the ideology that it espoused.  The
Hamidian regime simultaneously pushed a new state school system that theoretically
would encourage Ottomans of all sects to participate and a coordinated program to
bolster the Hanafi Islam in the provinces.291  Moreover, these two programs were
combined into one in the new Ottoman state schools.  Underlying the entire program was
the larger promotion of Sultan Abdul Hamid II as the Caliph of Sunni Islam.  Ottoman
sultans had nominally claimed the title in the past, Abdul Hamid hoped to use it for his
unique pan-Islamic campaign to foster unity across the Empire.292  In order to instill
official Ottoman Hanafi Islam under the leadership of Abdul Hamid II, the Hamidian
regime sent traveling ulama to Iraq, Cyprus, and Syria.293  These men preached morality
and how to recognize right from wrong, and missionary institutions and thought were
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certainly on the wrong side.294  These ulama were sent to regions that the Ottomans had
also slated for a new state school or government-sponsored mosque because the
Ottomans recognized that constructing a building took a good deal of time.295  In addition
to the mosques that the Ottomans already monitored through the waqf system,296 the
Ottomans constructed entirely new mosques.297  The combination of these three
government sponsored Islamic elements was designed to instill an official “Islamic
morality.”298  The new buildings were “set apart physically and architecturally [and were]
closer in style to other government structures than to the maktab or the madrasa of
classical Islam,” but inside they contained mosques.299  This new physical construction of
space was designed in order to contribute to a new Ottoman official understanding of
Islam that the Hamidian regime saw as essential for maintaining cohesion across the
Empire.  Inside these new buildings, the Ottoman state conducted an “optimistic attempt
to inculcate the discipline and morals it deemed necessary to control student behavior and
thought, and thereby safeguard the Empire’s future.”300  Students, when looking back on
their time in state schools, remembered studying the Islamic sciences without this posing
any issue of secular versus religious contradictions because “the schools were not
regarded and did not function as a secular environment apart from the religious one.”301
Each of these measures was designed to proactively supplant missionary education
because Ottoman state schools would now be providing the education that before only
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missionary schools could provide.  But for the Ottomans, proactive measures were not
enough to stem the tide of missionary influence.
The Ottomans first attempted to find out as much as possible about what
missionary education was going on in the Ottoman Empire.  They already had the legal
basis to do so; the 1869 Education law required private schools to register and provide
information on curriculum and teaching staff.  The vast majority of private schools in the
Ottoman Empire had not done this, but the Ottomans could not enforce the law of 1869 in
regards to private schools until they had instituted an effective system of educational
inspectors.  After first appointing a Greek to inspect the foreign schools, the Porte judged
later that it was too sensitive an issue to leave to anyone but a Muslim.302  With the
authority of the Ottoman government, these inspectors and the local educational councils
asked the various missions in the Empire for documentation on each of their schools
including especially when they began and whether the school had received official
license.  Secondly, the Ottomans wanted to determine whether the teachers in the schools
had diplomas.  Finally, they wanted to determine the nature of the curriculum in the
mission schools.303  By 1893, minister of education Zuhdu Pasha had enough information
to conclude that out of approximately four hundred Protestant and American schools in
the Empire, 341 functioned without official permission.304  The Ottomans also compiled a
separate list of just American schools.305  Another report issued by Zuhdu Pasha roughly
a year later explained that American schools had been spreading in the Empire like an
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“epidemic disease.”306  Based on these reports, Zuhdu Pasha recommended quickly
forcing these schools to obtain official licenses, preventing non-Ottoman subjects from
teaching in the schools, limiting future schools to areas with large amounts of foreign
students, requiring schools to accept inspections, and replacing the need for mission
school by building more Ottoman schools.307  Ultimately, these reports and
recommendations would be codified in laws beginning with the 1896 “Instructions
Concerning the Duties of Directors of Education in the Imperial Provinces” that
essentially made prosecution of the 1869 law easier.308  While over a roughly twenty-year
period, Ottoman measures concerning education were successful, they were certainly not
fast.  In order to demonstrate to mission schools (especially American ones) and to local
constituencies that they were serious about the reforms, the Ottoman authorities went to
the extreme of ordering local Ottoman authorities to close some mission schools.
The Ottoman regime of Abdul Hamid II had concrete fears of missionary
influence, especially American influence in Syria, in the Empire.  There were direct links
between missionary activity in the Empire, its perceived threat by the government of
Abdul Hamid, and the Ottoman imposition of reforms (especially in the field of
education) designed to limit and supplant missionary activity that used Islam as a means
of imperial control.  Ottoman initiatives under Abdul Hamid have been traditionally (and
wrongly) viewed as secular and therefore opposed to local Muslim initiatives.  The
secular interpretation is based on the influence that the French secular school system had
on Ottoman educational reforms.  Certainly, the Ottoman reforms were greatly influenced
by the French system, but the Ottomans also included their own policy of religious





education in state schools.  Ottoman educational reform under Abdul Hamid II employed
Islam and cooperated with local Islamic elements of Syrian society.  All of this was part
of a new imperial program designed to consolidate power, especially through the use of
Islam.  American, and other Christian, missionary schools came into conflict with the
Ottoman program both because the Ottomans were interested especially in keeping
Muslim areas of the Empire Muslim and because they sought the larger goal of moving
more students of all confessions into Ottoman state schools.  The final aim of the
Ottoman educational reforms under Abdul Hamid II was “to leave no Muslim pupil in
foreign schools.”309  Even though those state schools were imbued with Islam, the
Ottomans also desired to impart Ottomanism, which reached across religions, through
those schools.  Closings of American mission schools were only part of the Ottoman
initiative to stop the dangerous influence of the American missionaries.
Henry Jessup was aware of the Ottoman response, that new research has outlined
so well, to the work of foreign missions.310  Having benefited from recent scholarship on
Ottoman concerns about foreign education in the Hamidian period, the following chapter
considers both sides of the school controversy of 1885.311  Both the Ottoman officials and
Henry Jessup actually saw the controversy in a very similar way—as an outright
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competition for influence over the Ottoman subjects of Syria.  By 1860, when Jessup
arrived in Syria, the mission was forty years old, and its missionaries began to see Syria
more as their homeland and not just as a mission field as their missionary board
emphasized.312  Even if this conception of “Syria” was their own, their sense of belonging
to the region was “obvious.”313  This factor contributed to Jessup’s strong reaction to the
Ottoman measures of the 1880s; Jessup saw the people of Syria as more his field of
influence than the Ottoman authorities’.  This competition, that employed whatever
means necessary including educational, religious, cultural, and political manifestations of
influence, is described in Jessup’s writings beginning in 1885 with the same specifics,
tone, and implications of the Ottoman sources, both provincial and imperial.  Jessup’s
rhetoric around 1885 concerning Islam and the Ottoman Empire chiefly reflected this
context of opposition and not Jessup as an unchanging “Protestant Orientalist” and
“diehard missionary polemicist.”314
The 1885 School Controversy through Missionary Documents
  In the mind of Henry Jessup, the closing of the mission schools was proof that
the Ottoman government had shifted its policy from that of tolerance, embodied by the
Tanzimat period, to that of authoritarianism and exclusivity on religious grounds.
Jessup’s defensive reaction to the 1885 school closings and the larger context of Ottoman
educational initiatives in Syria was based on very real circumstances; however, Jessup,
like the Ottoman authorities, did not hesitate to exaggerate those circumstances in order
to support his vision for a successful American mission in Syria.  Despite his
exaggeration, Jessup’s switch in focus from other Christian competition before 1885 to
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Ottoman Islamic oppression suggests that his response was based on very real and new
circumstances that were not present before this time.  Jessup’s understanding of the
situation was, however, contested by other Americans in Syria.  Others, even those
supposedly under Jessup’s leadership, expressed clear disagreement with Jessup’s full-
fledged campaign to combat the Ottoman measures by any means available.  Further
complicating the nature of the competition between the American mission and the
Ottomans, both Jessup and the Ottomans expressed similar attitudes and actions
concerning the controversy over schools in Syria.  Both sides certainly saw education as
the primary means of implementing their influence.
Finally, secondary sources also shed light on Jessup’s response.  Some secondary
sources read Jessup’s response chiefly as proof of his own defensiveness and internal
weaknesses of the mission.  Other secondary sources corroborate Jessup’s understanding
of the events surrounding the school closings.  These evaluative themes will be explored
through the lenses of the four major pieces of writing that Jessup produced concerning
the school controversy: the Memorial of Missionaries, the Foreign Missionary,
missionary correspondence, and Jessup’s memoir.
Outline of School Controversy, 1885-1893
The overall picture of the events of the school controversy will be described
through Jessup’s writings; however, a brief outline will provide further clarity.  Initially,
the Ottoman authorities closed roughly thirty American missionary schools in Syria,
Palestine, and the Transjordan during the 1884-1885 school year.  Jessup, as director of
the American mission schools, responded by gathering as much information as he could
on the situation and publishing his findings as widely as possible in order to gain broader
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support.  Jessup rejected the Ottoman initiatives on multiple grounds and hoped that
through the influence of Western diplomacy, the situation might be reversed.  After these
initial efforts failed to gain enough currency to garner significant political support, Jessup
and the American mission tried to dodge further Ottoman closings but also were forced to
gather the information required by the 1869 Ottoman education law.  Jessup hoped that
this compliance would alleviate the immediate situation where further American schools
were closed and others were delayed in being reopened.  Having then submitted the
necessary paperwork, Jessup lobbied American diplomats and Ottoman authorities for the
reopening of American schools.  When these efforts did not meet with success, the
American mission attempted to discern whether or not the Ottomans only cared about
mission schools with Muslim students or if firmans were required.  Finally, as will be
addressed briefly in the epilogue and conclusion, Jessup and the American mission
resigned themselves to the current situation where the Ottoman laws, including the new
laws passed in the 1890s, became the new reality for the mission.
Memorial of Missionaries
The Memorial of Missionaries of 1886, composed by Henry Jessup in order to
raise support from Western Protestant diplomats in the Ottoman Empire and Christians in
general, describes his great offense at at least thirty-three mission schools being closed.315
Each of these schools was part of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian
Church’s mission in Syria, which had been separated from the American Board’s mission
in Anatolia in 1870.316  This document was the culmination of Jessup’s initial efforts after
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the school closings in the school year of 1884-1885.  After Jessup was made aware of
what was happening by letters and telegrams from the different mission posts throughout
Syria, he sent letters to his missionary contacts throughout Syria in an attempt to
comprehend the overall situation.317  Jessup also wanted to equip himself with as much
information as he could in order to prepare his response to the Ottoman measures.  His
target audience was the Protestant reading public in the West.  Interestingly, Jessup used
the term “Christian public” in order to make a broader appeal (as well as based on his
nineteenth century Protestant worldview where Protestants were the true Christians),
even though his actual audience was predominantly English-speaking Protestants.  The
document also acted as a formal request for action by the American consulate in Istanbul.
Jessup had already been in close contact with the American legation in Beirut led by
Erhard Bissinger, who according to a letter sent to Jessup on May 28, 1886, had actually
advised Jessup to write the Memorial in response to what he called “this vexatious school
question.”318
According to Jessup’s account, schools in the regions of Latakia, Adana, Tripoli,
Hama, and Hauran were closed by a combination of “bands of soldiers,” local sheikhs
forced to cooperate, local Mutasarrifs,319 local Kaimakams,320 or if no specific authority
is mentioned, by “the Turkish authorities.”  The closings were a shock to Jessup for many
reasons, not least of which was the fact that so many were closed around the same time.
This suggested that a new and coordinated plan of action had been undertaken by the
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government against the mission.  Jessup argued that “scores of schools of all grades were
in operation, and had been in operation for years before the school laws were enacted. . .
and since their enactment they have been almost universally ignored by the public
authorities.”  For Jessup, this illegal (again based on his perception of the Tanzimat
reform), unjust, and exclusionary government action had come out of nowhere.  Jessup
expressed his understanding of the situation by asserting that “recently, repressive
measures of the most severe character have been enforced” that would eventually lead to
the “virtual extinction of all but the Mohammedan schools.”  Jessup pins the blame for
this situation squarely on the “official persecution by the Turkish authorities” that was
designed to limit the work of the “Christian schools” and support new Muslim schools
run by “fanatical Mohammedan” Khotibs.
Certainly, Jessup used language (Turkish, fanatical, Mohammedan) as other
polemical American writings of the time did—to essentialize the Ottomans and Islam.
Many Ottoman administrative figures in the nineteenth century were not Turkish; many
were Albanians, Greeks, or Arabs.   The use of the term “Mohammedan” inherently
suggested that Islam was a heretical religion centered around the Prophet Muhammad; no
Muslim would refer to him or herself by this term.  His continued use of these terms
throughout the Memorial suggests their importance to his rhetoric.  His use of terms here
is also similar to that of his two publications of the 1870s discussed in chapter three,
which suggests that Jessup used these terms in publications for home consumption
because they would have both resonated with that audience who knew very little about
Islam and because they would portray a certain negative image of Islam vis-à-vis
American Christianity.  His use of the term in publications even after thirty years in Syria
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also supports Khalaf’s point that “Jessup was still upholding the same medieval mindset,
with all the unflattering images, that he had carried over with him from New England half
a century earlier.”321 At the same time, as will be discussed below, these terms do not
appear in Jessup’s unpublished writing.322
The entire Memorial of Missionaries actually addresses various grievances that
Jessup held against the Ottoman authorities, but for the purposes of this study it is most
germane to focus on those relating to the closing of schools.  Jessup levels seven major
charges on different levels against the Ottoman and local authorities in regard to the
closing of schools.  First, Jessup argued that the history of laws relating to missionary
schools did not justify the current closings.  Second, the closings occurred without
justification and not according to the law.  Third, the Ottomans were depriving many
people of the only opportunity for education.  Fourth, the Ottomans were unfairly
prejudicial against Protestant (especially American) institutions.  Fifth, the closings
coincided with the opening of Islamic institutions.  Sixth, it was impossible to meet
Ottoman demands as they were not even following their own rules, especially regarding
the makeup of local councils of education who had the authority to decide educational
policy.  Finally, they were using unjust taxation to pay for this new program.  This
extensive list was designed to convince his audience, the consulates of the Protestant
powers in Istanbul and the Protestant public at large, that a combined effort was needed
to reverse the recent course in Syria of Ottoman official persecution of American
missionary institutions as well as of Ottoman official support for Muslim institutions.
                                                 
321 Khalaf, 167.
322 Further study would benefit the question of Jessup’s terminology.  It would be especially interesting to
find out what terminology Jessup used when directly addressing the Muslims he encountered in Syria.  My
research for this thesis would need to be extended in order to more fully evaluate this issue.
105
Jessup truly regarded the closing of schools as a deliberate policy of the Ottoman
government to augment Islam at the detriment of Christianity as well as hoped to use
exaggeration to convince his audience of this position.
Based on the Ottoman documents concerning the Hamidian educational program
of the 1880s evaluated above, Jessup’s account hits very near the mark.  Jessup was
especially aware of the coordination of the Ottoman’s retroactive measure of closing
American schools with their proactive measure of opening schools.  Jessup’s perception
of the lack of separation between state schools and Muslim education also reflects the
reality of the mingling of Ottoman state measures with local Muslim notable figures.
Most specifically, Jessup points out the fact that local ulama, whom he calls “fanatical
Mohammedan khotibs,” were involved in the Ottoman program.323  As Jessup correctly
understands, Ottoman official measures were not in discord with local Muslim efforts.
Rather they were designed to bolster what was already there and had been shown to be
lacking.324  There was crossover of teachers, students, curriculum, materials, space, and
religiosity between the religious and state school systems, and this system was also
supported by local ulama.325  Some local ulama, such as Mahmud Hamzazade, the Hanafi
mufti of Damascus, even participated directly as members of the provincial educational
councils set up by the Ottomans.326  Hamzazade was the head of the Damascus provincial
council of education from 1878 to 1885.327  In short, to “ignore the strong religious
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element in the Hamidian educational movement is to overlook a significant component of
its raison d’etre and numerous aspects of its practical application.”328
Jessup’s correspondence with Bissinger, the American diplomatic official in
Beirut , also reveals, however, that Jessup was certainly not impartially recounting facts
about the situation.  Bissinger noted to Jessup that some of his numbers about schools the
Ottomans had closed were incorrect, but Jessup did not change the document before
publication.329  Bissinger in fact told Jessup that two, not twenty-one schools had been
closed near Latakia.  Bissinger does, however, agree with Jessup that the Ottomans were
not complying with their own laws (specifically the 1869 education law that dictated how
private schools in the Empire should be governed by the authorities) because there were
only ten members of the regional board of education in 1886, not the required fourteen.
Bissinger went on to list the specific names of those on the regional board and gave this
as proof that the Ottomans did not actually have legal authority to close American
schools in Syria.330  It is not possible based on the sources currently available to know
exactly who was right about the statistics of the closings, but certainly the discourse with
Bissinger demonstrates that Jessup wrote the Memorial with a certain purpose that did
not preclude using exaggeration and selective use of statistics to make an argument.  Nor
did this purpose prevent Jessup attempting to make use of the American diplomatic
(secular) structure in the Ottoman Empire, despite the fact that Jessup was at times, as
with the statistic dispute, directly contradicted by the members of the American legation.
A.L. Tibawi, the main scholar who has studied the American mission in the
context of the 1885 school closings, on the whole argues that the Memorial did not
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represent the reality of the situation in Syria.  Tibawi only believed in the partial validity
of the section of the Memorial that dealt with school closings (the only portion that this
paper addresses), which contributed to his skepticism of that section.  For Tibawi, Jessup
was “more concerned with answering critics and apologizing to friends [as well as]
finding an external scapegoat for internal stagnation and inadequacy” than in representing
a concern based on reality.331  In short, Tibawi argues that Jessup’s perception and
argument that “the Ottoman education law and the school system based upon it were
inspired by hostility to Protestant missions” must be rejected as “unsatisfactory.”332
Tibawi justifies his skepticism also by referring to the situation as nothing but a small
matter, as a defensive reaction by Jessup whose teachers lacked the necessary
documentation, as unimportant because the schools closed were in rural areas, as
fomented by over-zealous local officials, by a twenty-year grace period since the 1869
law, as not supported by other Christian mission groups in the region, and finally because
in his mind this was just another case of Jessup displaying his continual “hostility to the
Ottoman system. . .and hatred of Islam.”333
While there is certainly some truth in Tibawi’s understanding of the Memorial as
we have seen that both Jessup and the Ottomans were willing to employ many different
tactics to support their cause, his argument lacks the recent research about the definite
Ottoman official fears concerning American missionary efforts.  New research highlights
the wealth of Ottoman documents from Istanbul and Syria that specifically reference the
danger of American mission schools and the larger interpretation of Hamidian policy that
used the 1869 law for its own larger purposes of education reform that would instill
                                                 




obedience in Ottoman subjects by pushing an official connection with Islam.  The
Memorial certainly shows that Jessup was aware of this larger plan.  Furthermore, if
numbers of schools are taken as a measure of the growing importance of American
schools in influencing Syrian youths, Tibawi underestimates the real importance of
American schools in the region, particularly in the rural areas.  American common
schools, those teaching young children basic reading skills as well as often some English,
were spread throughout Syria in regions that would have only had traditional millet or
Muslim education if even that.  For Jessup, the long-time head of the American mission,
the efforts of the mission constituted the central effort of his life—one that he
passionately believed in because it met real needs of Syrian people, particularly those in
the underdeveloped rural regions of Syria that the Ottomans had ignored.  In addition, if
the Ottoman authorities had attempted to close American schools in the cities of Syria,
this would have caused a more serious reaction by the foreign powers in Istanbul, which
they did not want to face.  Indeed, this is also part of the reason why few of the other
missions participated in the campaign of the Memorial; their schools had not been closed
in part because their consular officials had more power in Istanbul than the American
officials there.
Finally, even the specific tone of the Memorial mirrors that of the Ottoman
documents about mission schools.  For Jessup, as for the Ottomans, the possibilities for
the future were so great, but the current disastrous problems threaten to prevent this.
Jessup’s conclusion describes how the current “repressive measures” will act to “revive
Mohammedan hostility,” to “rekindle fires that may not be easily extinguished,” to
“reverse the liberal and clement” policies of the past, to encourage “Mohammedan hatred
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to Christian churches and schools,” and to “rouse a spirit which would soon become
uncontrollable, and end in a repetition of the scenes of 1860.”  If not for these
persecutions, the American mission efforts to bring the “only means of education and
enlightenment open to the Christians of Syria and Palestine” would be allowed to thrive
in the future.  The Memorial, taken in its entirety, echoes the Ottoman sources (and the
argument of the scholars mentioned above) in its defensive yet hopeful tone, description
of specific events, concept of larger Ottoman initiatives, description of the significance of
American schools, and warnings for the future.
The Foreign Missionary
Jessup argued similarly about the closing of American mission schools in Syria by
the Ottoman authorities in the official publication of the Board of Foreign Missions of the
Presbyterian Church, under which the Syria mission had operated since 1870.  In an
attempt to portray the desperate nature of the situation to the readers, Jessup warned that
the “whole influence of the government is more and more anti-Christian” because of
what he saw as their objective to “strengthen the Moslem and repress the Christian
element in the Empire.”334  He also described to the readers how the situation was not just
about the persecution of the work of the American mission, but also how the government
was attempting to set up Muslim institutions as a replacement.  Specifically, the
government was “aiding in the repair of old mosques, and the building of new ones” that
were not required to pass through the same administrative hoops as American mission
institutions.335  Jessup also added that the work of the American presses in the Ottoman
Empire had also come under what he called a “new and repressive policy on the part of
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the Turkish government.”336  In all of this, Jessup echoed the tone expressed in the
Memorial of Missionaries that the Ottoman repression of the mission was a new
occurrence where “formerly there was nothing of this hostility” and “now everything
bearing the Christian name seems to be under the ban.”337  Through Jessup’s writing in
the Memorial of Missionaries and in The Foreign Missionary, he had made himself the
mouthpiece for the Presbyterian mission to Syria in hopes that he could convince other
Protestants of the plight of the mission.  Jessup’s language gives a clear picture of a
desperate situation.
Missionary Correspondence
Based on missionary correspondence that was never published, a clearer picture
emerges of the great frustration that Jessup felt over the school closing controversy.
From the initial school closings in 1885 into the 1890s, Jessup corresponded with his
fellow missionaries, pleaded for support from the American and other consulates, and
asked local officials to reopen  schools that had been closed and for the promise that no
further schools would be closed that had fulfilled the requirements of the 1869 Ottoman
education law.  The correspondence demonstrates that Jessup, as well as other American
missionaries, felt that their efforts were often in vain as the Ottoman authorities enclosed
the American schools in a sea of red tape.  This struggle that often bore no fruit left
Jessup in a state near despair.
The case of the American school at Hama offers an excellent example of the
American frustration as well as providing for a more concrete vision of how the school
closings were actually carried out.  In 1889, in the continuation of the controversy that
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began with the school closings in 1885, a missionary school for boys of roughly eighty
students in Hama was closed.  The story of the closing is recounted in letters from
September 10, 1889 and September 13, 1889 between Henry Jessup and Erhard
Bissinger, the American consul in Beirut in the 1880s.338  Jessup was in fairly constant
communication with Bissinger during the years of the 1885 school controversy pleading
for consular intervention with the authorities in Istanbul, which Jessup always called
Constantinople.  Jessup’s continued use of the ancient Christian name for the city
demonstrates that even in unpublished documents, Jessup’s Protestant American bias did
at times show itself.
Jessup informed Bissinger how the headmaster of the Hama school, a native
convert to Protestantism named Selloun, recounted to Jessup how the Waly of Damascus
sent him telegraph orders to close the school or face consequences.  Jessup wrote back
immediately by telegram instructing Selloun not to close the school until forced to do so.
Later, Selloun sent a second telegraph explaining how one officer and five soldiers had
come to the school and forcibly closed it.
Jessup, in his letters to Bissinger, fumed over the situation of the Hama school.
Jessup complained, “we have fought this fight for two years and supposed we had the
victory.”  Because the “Waly of Damascus yields to local intrigue and influence, instead
of obeying the laws,” it “imperils every American school in Syria.”  For Jessup, the
“arbitrary act” of the Hama school closing proved that there was “evidently duplicity
somewhere—we believe the government has sent secret orders nullifying the order of
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May 16” that had stated that American schools needed no special permit to stay open.339
This statement is significant because it reveals Jessup’s clear belief that, while local
events or leaders may have predicated a specific school closing, the real impetus was
from the Ottoman central government in Istanbul.  For Jessup, this systematic program of
closing American mission schools would not have occupied the American mission since
1885 if it were not for the policy of the Ottoman central government.  The Waly was
determined, based on the supposed secret orders, to close the schools “at all hazards”
against the Grand Vezir’s order of May 16, which Jessup was sure that the Waly had
received.  Jessup concludes the letter by exclaiming, “at this rate, American rights will
seem to be trampled in the dust.”  His last words in the letter ask the seemingly
despairing question “is there no relief?”
These two letters between Jessup and Bissinger are a fitting example of Jessup’s
perception of persecution.  Facing what he believed to be a deliberate program against the
main manifestation of mission work, the schools, Jessup cast blame for the situation on
specific conflicts in Hama stirred up by town notables, local and regional authorities, and
on the Ottoman central government.  He used every available means to combat the school
closings, particularly appealing to the local and central government on his own and
through American and other consulates, but he still felt that these efforts might result in
nothing.  The fact that these pessimistic feelings were present even in an unpublished
letter suggests that Jessup truly felt oppressed.  Despite Jessup’s strong tone and
condemnations of the Ottoman central government and local officials, not once does
Jessup mention anything having to do with Islam in the letter.  Jessup is indeed deeply
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upset by the situation, but his response in this unpublished letter is practical not
polemical.  Jessup’s first interest is in finding out just what the Ottoman authorities are
doing; at that point, Jessup will continue to use what influence he has on Western
diplomats in order to alter the course of events.
Jessup’s Memoir
Keeping in mind that memoirs can be as much a record of their own time as a
description of past events,340 Jessup’s memoir, 53 Years in Syria, must be read with
caution.  This work has been so extensively used by historians for information about
Ottoman Syria and Jessup himself that it risks being overused.  A massive two-volume
work, Jessup’s memoir is the closest thing to an encyclopedia of the history of the Syria
mission as is available.  Interestingly, however, Jessup gives very scant reference to the
school controversy of the 1880s in 53 Years in Syria.  For example, in the timeline that
Jessup provides at the back of the work, he does mention the 1869 Ottoman education
law, but mainly as a reference to the limits that it legalized on the efforts of the American
Press.341  Furthermore, the timeline contains no reference to the school conflict, which
took up most of Jessup’s time for nearly a decade.  Instead, for the year 1887 Jessup cites
the Sultan placing the “seal of authorization upon thirty-three different editions of the
Arabic Scriptures and parts of Scriptures.”342  It seems that Jessup chose to remember
positive aspects of the history of the mission from the 1880s rather than recount a major
shift in the policy of the American mission where the mission was forced to adhere to
Ottoman statutes that limited American evangelical work.  In the body of the memoir,
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Jessup does not reference the beginning of the school closings in 1885, but there are two
references to Ottoman closings of American schools in 1888.  However, Jessup neglects
to describe the reality of events.  He does mention the Memorial of Missionaries, but
concludes that the issue was resolved when the Ottoman education minister “issued
orders recognizing all existing schools and forbidding interference with them.”343  The
minister did indeed issue such orders, but this was hardly the end of the conflict, as
Jessup complained about in his letters to Bissinger on September tenth and thirteenth of
1889.344  Jessup does give a more complete account of the school controversy later,
however.  Jessup accurately describes the back and forth between Ottoman strictures and
his response, and he concludes the matter on the question of whether or not the Ottomans
and Americans agreed on American schools being left alone “on the condition that only
Christian children be received.”345  Jessup says that the American legation refused these
terms, and “finally the schools were reopened without conditions.”346  Not admitting that
the schools may not actually have been reopened without conditions, Jessup simply offers
that “much has been published since that time and much has been done in the way of
securing American schools.”347  Ultimately, Jessup leaves the reader with as close to an
admission that the American schools had to give in concerning the school issue as he
seems capable of:
The medical college in Beirut is visited every year by an imperial medical
commission, who, in connection with the American faculty, examine the
students and confer upon the worthy the imperial medical diploma.
Various questions with regard to the American institutions remain
unsettled, but, as a rule, the established day-schools, boarding-schools,
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and colleges are not interfered with.  Where the government refuses a
permit, it is generally through fear that a school or hospital with a permit
may refuse to pay taxes.  In this respect, the Americans would cheerfully
pay taxes if the institutions of other nationalities did the same.  But to be
asked to do what no one else does, and to bear the burdens which the
Sultan has excused other from bearing, savours (sic) too strongly of
injustice and partiality to be meekly endured by an American official.348
Despite the fact that Jessup seems to dwell more on the positive in his memoir, his
negative language about Islam remains, although to a somewhat lessened extent.  For
example, on the question of whether the intricacies of American Protestant
denominations mattered in Syria, Jessup pointed out that “Mohammedans and heathens
care nothing and understand little of our peculiar differences.”349  But in reference to the
school controversy, Jessup wrote of being “kept busy by the Ottoman government.”350
Conclusion on Jessup’s writing
The most consistent and credible critique of Jessup’s defensive response to the
1885 school closings is that Jessup ignored the fact that the Ottomans were primarily
concerned with mission schools in predominantly Muslim areas.  A.L. Tibawi has made
this case effectively, and the later work of Benjamin Fortna and Selcuk Somel support his
conclusions.351  Fortna argues that the Ottomans “used the weapon of school closure
sparingly and mainly as a means of maintaining” the historical practice of missionary
work in minority Muslim regions (such as Beirut).352  For example, Somel has pointed
out that “the foundation of [Ottoman] public schools in a certain locality or the raising of
the educational quality of a government institution was often contingent on the positive
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inclination of the local Muslim population in question toward foreign institutions.”353
Somel mentions specifically that the “setting up of public schools among the Nusairi
population in the sancak of Latakia (vilayet of Beirut) commenced only after American
missionaries began to be active among the local population.”354  This is also particularly
interesting because the Ottomans here considered the Nusairis, a heterodox Muslim
group, as Muslims.  Abdul Hamid was, first and foremost, concerned about maintaining
legitimacy as the sultan of Islam—the defender of Hanafi Sunni Islam throughout his
realm.355  Education was the primary means by which the Hamidian regime attempted
carry out this mandate.  This program was, however, not mutually exclusive with
concurrent programs to maintain legitimacy with various millets of the Empire, as
expressions of legitimacy often overlapped.  In the end, though, the “final aim” of the
Ottoman government under Abdul Hamid was to “leave no Muslim pupil in foreign
schools.”356
At the same time, to aver that Jessup’s claims were essentially propaganda
designed to cater to his audience in the West and to find “an external scapegoat for
internal stagnation and inadequacy” is to overemphasize the Ottoman focus on Muslim
areas and to miss the larger point about how the missionaries and the Ottomans conceived
of their influence in Syria.357  Both felt that the region was theirs to work in, certainly
with competition, but both looked forward to their ultimate success in molding the people
of Syria to their vision of the future.  Jessup’s position held much less legal, political, or
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historical weight, but in his missionary mindset, he held firm.  For the Ottomans, this was
a Syria that was increasingly under the imperial sway and that contributed to the growing
need for military officers and educated bureaucrats.  As a result, the Ottomans were not
limited in scope merely to outlying missionary outposts in predominantly Muslim
regions.  Rather, they were interested in the gradual replacement of all missionary
influence by the imposition of their own new school system, and the imperial rubric that
followed.  Ideally, the Ottomans wanted to foster a “common sense of loyalty among
Muslims and non-Muslim students in competent state schools” and to limit new
missionary schools “only to those areas with a sufficient number of foreign children in
need of education,” not just to majority Christian regions.358  In the meantime, they were
willing to be pragmatic by mainly limiting coerced closing of missionary schools to those
areas where mainly Muslims resided and had been complaining to the Ottomans for help
accordingly.  Not only would this satisfy provincial calls for help from Istanbul thereby
bolstering Syrian Muslim loyalty, but also the action would not rouse a concerted and
coordinated effort of the Western powers on behalf of the mission establishments.  The
American diplomatic efforts, with only lackluster help from the British, would be much
easier for the Ottomans to manage than if they had closed a British or Jesuit school.
For Jessup, the vision of the future entailed a Syria that was increasingly
autonomous, most probably under British protectorate as Egypt and Cyprus already were.
This would then allow for the possibility of direct proselytism of Muslims and the
entrance of Syria into the world of “civilized” nations—meaning especially those molded
by Protestant Christian civilization.  In the present, the Syria mission, under Jessup’s
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leadership, was interested in the expansion of its schools throughout Syria to create “facts
on the ground” that would be increasingly difficult to limit.  This would also include a
continuance of the American policy of opening schools in rural areas where no other
modern schools existed, both for altruistic and more self-interested reasons.  If the
American school were the only one around, of course the possibility of Muslims or other
non-Christian groups attending would be higher.  Jessup’s vision (following the trend that
the mission had followed since the late 1820s) still remained pragmatically to work with
local Christians first, but with the maintenance of a larger vision of transformation of the
Muslim edifice of the Ottoman world through that initial work.  If, in the present, this
vision also meant that a certain amount of Muslims, Druzes, and Nusairis were educated
in American mission schools, so much the better.
In conclusion, Jessup’s writings about the school controversy from 1885 to 1893
reflect the same historical circumstances, objectives in the present, and hopes for the
future as those of their Ottoman counterparts.  Selim Deringil, writing about Abdul
Hamid and his administration in their struggle to hold off Great Power encroachment,
argues that they still had agency: “operating under severe constraints, to be sure, they
were nonetheless able to carve out a critical space for maneuver in an increasingly hostile
environment.”359  The same was true of Jessup and the American mission in Syria as they
continued to run their schools and combat the Ottoman closings through every method
available to them.  Both felt oppressed and responded in such a way as to hold onto what
they felt was theirs: influence over the people of Syria.  This chapter has argued that, at
least up to 1893, the missionaries “critical space for maneuver” diminished based on the
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Hamidian measures.  The following chapter of the paper will address briefly the history
of the mission after 1893 in order to provide a brief view of how the controversy that
originally began in 1885 continued a decade later and more.
Based on the specifics, tone, and implications of both Ottoman and missionary
sources, it is clear that Jessup and the Ottoman officials had a similar understanding of
the school controversy of the 1880s.  In other words, not only are the specific facts
presented by both sides similar (even to the point that Ottoman statistics designed to limit
mission influence were in part constructed based on Jessup’s reports), but also the tone
and rhetoric of the writing are remarkable similar.  Both recognized that American
schools had only recently become a perceived threat to the Ottoman government.
Jessup’s rhetoric implies shock that the Ottomans, who had shown tolerance in the past,
were now imposing such a harsh change of policy.  The Ottomans also expressed surprise
at how little they actually knew about American schools; their sharp action in response
also suggests the truth of this fact—if something were not to be done soon the situation
might get out of hand.  For example, the Ottoman education minister Munif Pasha
admitted in 1886 to a lack of knowledge about foreign schools, so much so that the first
Ottoman-appointed education inspector was a Greek even when the purpose of the
education program was to boost official Islam in schools.360
In addition, because the Ottomans saw education as the key to influencing the
people of Syria, the “disparity between the pessimism over present circumstances and the
optimism for the future speaks to the tremendous hope that state officials placed on
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education.”361  The exact same could also be said of Henry Jessup as the Director of the
American mission schools in Syria.  It was through education that the “only means of
enlightenment” would be brought to the people of Syria.362  These tones of stagnancy and
idealism are also similarly couched in language of center-periphery.  The “laments” and
“desperate pleas for help” by Ottoman officials in the province of Syria (provincial)
reflects a “bleak” situation where they as governors with insufficient funding from
Istanbul (center) were incapable of properly combating the “ominous presence” of
missionaries who were “seemingly able to command vast financial, cultural, and political
resources.”363  Jessup’s writing in the Foreign Missionary and the Memorial of
Missionaries reflects the same need for help in Syria (provincial) from the Protestant
diplomats in Istanbul (center) as well as for funding from the mission board in the United
States (center) and its donors/supporters.  The similarities between Jessup’s and Ottoman
rhetoric speak to their shared interest: influencing the people of Syria to think and act
according to each of their worldviews.
Jessup and the Ottomans both showed a willingness to compete using whatever
means available to them; they also did not see it as a problem that their measures
transcended the boundaries of secular and religious, factual and exaggerated, overt and
covert, or ally and enemy.  It is interesting to note that, for the purposes of this
educational struggle, they were both  even willing to bend the lines of their frameworks
of religious orthodoxy/orthopraxy and “civilized” versus “backwards.”  For example, the
Ottomans conceived of the Druzes or Nusairis (Alawis) as Muslims in need of official
protection and education, and Jessup conceived of Eastern Christians and Roman
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Catholics as members of the “Christian public” who should (if in the West) care about
this persecution of fellow “Christians” and should (if in the Ottoman Empire) be allowed
to receive the benefits of American missionary education.
Furthermore, both sides saw the people of Syria as part of their natural “sphere of
influence”.  Jessup showed no deference, until forced in practice to do so, to Ottoman
imperial control.  This suggests a larger center-periphery issue: many residents of Syria
felt the new and oppressive presence of the Hamidian reforms—not just Jessup and/or the
American missionaries.  The following section will demonstrate this new impact of
Ottoman impositions on Syria overall in the 1880s.
The Larger Context of Competition over local influence
Based on the closing of missionary schools in 1885 and the years following by the
Ottoman authorities, the fact that Jessup presented the new major threat of the Ottoman
government (as opposed to other foreign missions and local Christians in the past) in his
writing is understandable.  While the nearby Jesuit school or Greek Orthodox school may
have had the ability to take possible students away from American schools, to plead with
the Ottoman authorities for intervention, and to use diplomacy to influence Ottoman
actions; neither of the other groups had the direct power to bring soldiers and forcibly
close a missionary school, as the Ottomans did.
However, Jessup’s shift in rhetoric belies the fact that competition other than that
from Ottoman-Islamic schools in the arena of education continued, and perhaps even
increased in the 1880s.  The following discussion of local Christian and Muslim
educational efforts as well as other foreign (especially non-Protestant) schools contributes
to an understanding of why both the Ottoman authorities and the American mission
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described the situation in Syria in such drastic tones.  Both felt that the educational
competition was already stiff enough and realized the great potential for others to move
in on their “sphere of influence”. 
Local Christian Initiatives
Recent scholarship, particularly that of Jens Hanssen, has demonstrated that the
region surrounding Beirut was also a center of local educational initiative.  Local
Christians, notably Butrus al-Bustani, attempted to create local educational opportunities
other than those provided by foreign missionaries or the state.  Bustani’s project,
beginning in 1863, was a cross-confessional enterprise designed to prevent Syria from
falling into a repeat of the violence of 1860.  The curriculum of the school included
Arabic literature, French language, mathematics, and English; and the students came
from as far away as Iraq and Greece.364  Bustani’s project coincided with the other millet
high schools that opened in the decade after the Syrian civil war, as mentioned above,
although Bustani’s was different in that any student could participate.
Local Muslim Initiatives
Various Muslim groups, especially those with Islamic reformist leanings, had also
begun to attempt reform of the local Muslim schools of Syria.  Through the influence of
reformist ulama like Muhammad Abduh who had fled to Beirut after the British takeover
of Egypt in 1882, these local Muslim groups constructed their own schools as well as
pleaded with the Ottomans to improve the state schools.  Abduh’s influence was key for
Syrian Muslim educational initiatives because he was able to win over the support of
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conservative local ulama.365  Muslim reformists in Syria did not want to use the model of
foreign missionaries (“rivals with a head start”) or the traditional Muslim model
(“obstacles to Muslim enlightenment”).366  Abduh molded the new school, the al-
madrasa al-sultaniyya, into an institution that would teach “industrial sciences,
intellectual discussion, and moral character building” through a curriculum that included
multiple languages, sciences, mathematics, as well as religious studies.367  Christians who
attended would have to study Islamic jurisprudence, but they would also be allowed to
attend Sunday courses taught by an appointed Priest.368
The success of the school combined with Abduh’s fame enabled him to write a
prescriptive letter to the Sheikh-ul-Islam of the Ottoman Empire describing the need for
modern state schools against the threat of missionary education.  Abduh saw missionary
education as resulting in a situation where “by the end of their schooling their hearts
become void of every Islamic bond and pass out as infidels under the cover of the name
of Islam.”369  Abduh added, however, differently than most of the pleas from the
provinces mentioned above that mainly sought more funds, that a new Muslim state
education (such as that found at his school in Beirut)  was needed that would provide a
competing modern education to that offered in mission schools.  Abduh returned to Egypt
in 1888 before seeing a definite increase in Ottoman initiatives there,370 especially the
absorption of the school he started with the Ottoman state school in Beirut.371










Finally, the British, Italians, French, Germans, and Russians were also active in
the field of education in Syria.  At times the American missionaries and Ottomans
directed complaints against these establishments, but the existing system of capitulations,
the confessional diversity in Syria, and the continued need for benevolent enterprises
(such as schools, orphanages, and medical clinics) overall allowed these groups to find
their own “sphere of influence” that did not bring them into the type of conflict with the
Ottoman authorities that the American mission faced.  Most of these groups were not as
widespread or as longstanding as the American mission, and the French, the main
exception to this, thrived in their historical milieu of work with the Maronite community.
By World War I, France was the unquestioned leader of foreign education in the Ottoman
Empire, especially in Syria as there were roughly 500 French ecclesiastical schools with
between 50,000 and 60,000 students.372  This extremely complex educational situation in
Syria presented the American mission and the Ottomans with a multifaceted challenge to
what they each viewed as their natural domain—the people (for the Americans,
especially the Christians) of Syria.
Jessup, who up to 1885, had complained most about local Christian and other
foreign competition in Syria, set aside this rhetoric once the Ottomans began their new
education program in the 1880s.  Jessup was now confronted with the reality of American
schools being forcibly closed by the command of the sovereign Ottoman authorities.  At
the same time, however, his defensive tone also reflects this wider climate of educational
competition in Syria from local Christian, local Muslim, and foreign power initiatives.
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Chapter V: Epilogue to the School Controversy
This brief chapter will demonstrate that the 1885 school controversy represented a
victory for the Hamidian centralization plan.  It is true that the American mission schools
were able to continue to function either by following the Ottoman educational policies or
by operating quietly in predominantly Christian areas.  However, Jessup’s response to the
school closings in the 1880s was the last time that the American mission hoped to
challenge Ottoman regulations in order to maintain Rufus Anderson’s policy of education
designed primarily to gain Protestant sympathizers or converts.  The Ottomans were
clearly aware that the American schools were not teaching purely secular subjects and
that students who went through the missionary schools had tendencies that the Hamidian
regime feared and resented, on political and religious grounds.  Jessup recognized that the
Ottoman reforms of the 1880s in Syria would call the future of American mission
education into question and fought hard to prevent this.  In the end, the American mission
was forced to comply with Ottoman educational regulations that required the submission
of diplomas for teachers, curriculum information, and educational materials.
Abdul Hamid’s goal was to both limit missionary influence, especially in
education, and to build up Ottoman state education (based upon the model of Western
schools) as a replacement for missionary institutions.  The Ottomans reasoned that if they
were able to fill the vacuum of educational need, they would be able to bolster their own
power and detract from that of the missionaries.  This policy was based upon the many
calls from the provinces complaining of the lack of Ottoman-Muslim education and the
successful influence of mission education, even to the extent that Muslim elites sent their
children to mission schools.  This two-pronged strategy sought to fulfill both goals
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simultaneously.  First, the Ottomans were able to compile enough information on the
missionary institutions to be able to monitor their activities more closely.  This
knowledge enabled them to pass laws in the 1890s and into the 1900s that detailed
educational policies to an even greater extent than the education law of 1869.373  Second,
through the 1890s and up until World War I and the end of the Ottoman Empire, the
Ottomans were increasingly able to provide the services that the American (and other
foreign) missionaries used to be the only ones to provide.  The main examples of this
were modern education, medical services, orphanages, and printing presses.  A specific
example of this was the Ottoman College in Syria started in 1895.374  Ottoman control
extended further and further into the provinces as the effects of centralization began to
take place.
The Ottomans were not able to shut down American schools or prevent them from
growing in size or prestige (this was especially true for missionary schools of higher
education such as the Syrian Protestant College and Robert College), but they were able
to keep that growth within the confines of their plan for moral discipline (and therefore
political order) by enforcing the education law of 1869.  In other words, the Ottomans
tolerated, and perhaps even benefited from, the continuance of missionary education
because it now remained within their ideological limits and also produced educated
graduates who became beneficial members of society.  For example, the Ottomans
dictated that all medical students had to take the official government exam before being
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legally licensed, even if they had been educated at the Syrian Protestant College on their
own and missionary funds.375
This victory of Ottoman educational policy necessarily dictated that American
schools would grow increasingly secular, as clearly occurred in the 1890s and beyond.376
Over time, missionary ideology changed based on years of frustration due to a lack of
success in reaching Muslims with their message.  Missionaries came to hold a “social
gospel” position that saw education for education’s sake as being a mission in itself.377
This shift also fit internal liberalizing developments within Western Protestantism.378  No
longer was preaching the Christian message such a key goal for missionaries.  The
ultimate example of this trend was the change of the Syrian Protestant College to the
American University of Beirut in 1920.
Two other factors contributed to this increased secularization and marginalization
of American missionary education.  In the 1890s, an increased number of Syrian
Christians began to emigrate, many to the United States.379  The American mission also
had trouble obtaining funds from the United States.380  These factors also contributed to a
trend of entrenchment in the American schools that limited their influence.
In 1906, shortly before Jessup’s death in 1910, Jessup attended a missionary
conference in Cairo that brought Protestant missionaries from around the world together
to discuss questions relating to missions in the Muslim world.  In part of the conference
entitled “The Mohammedan World of Today,” which obviously still used the Orientalist
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terminology, Jessup gave the introductory paper.  His paper focused on the main issue of
what he called the “Spiritual Destitution of Islam.”381  Jessup wavers between viewpoints
that are similar to those that he expounded in the 1870s in Syrian Home Life and the
Mohammedan Missionary Problem and viewpoints that suggest a gradual development of
his thought towards a greater acceptance of Islam for what is truly is.  For example,
Jessup begins by quoting the British writer on Islam Sir William Muir, 382 who is
notorious for his scathing pamphlets concerning Islam: “the sword of Mohammed and the
Koran are the most stubborn enemies of civilization, liberty, and truth which the world
has yet known.”383  But Jessup then goes on to continually use the term “Islam,” even
though at times he does still use the pejorative term “Mohammedan” and even though his
use of “Islam” is often for the purpose of denigrating it as a system of faith.384  Jessup
also argues that one of the urgent needs for missionaries in the Muslim world is to show
Muslims that “Christians are not their enemies” because long wars have put Christians in
the position of political hostility, which can only be overcome with “patience, kindness,
and Christ.”385  He is also sensitive to the specific context in “Turkey” where Christians
are “political foes of Islam,” so missionary tactics should be education, distribution of
scripture in local languages, prayer, and living a “Christian life.”386  Jessup concludes by
implicitly praising imperialism by reminding his listeners that the best hopes for
conversions of Muslims are in countries like Egypt and India that are not ruled by a
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Muslim ruler.387  Jessup’s speech to the 1906 Cairo Conference demonstrates the
complexity of his ever-changing attitudes as a missionary.  In 1906, Jessup both uses
Orientalist language less frequently and advocates non-imperialist methods; but at the
same time, Jessup displays attitudes that marked his writing in the 1870s when he hoped
that the British would increase their political sway in the Ottoman Empire.  Despite the
maintenance of some Orientalist language and viewpoints, Jessup seems to have been
changed by his long years in Syria.




Henry Jessup’s long career as a missionary in Syria saw him outlast several
Ottoman sultans, Ottoman political periods, crises of the mission, ideological periods of
the mission, American diplomats, and even wives.  His work in Syria began in 1856, the
year of the second Tanzimat edict and four years before the 1860 civil war altered Syrian
society and politics completely.  In 1856, Rufus Anderson was still firmly in control of
the American Board, which was not even the mission board under which Jessup served
most of his time in Syria.  The American mission to Syria in 1856 was still a small and
somewhat insignificant mission in the overall scheme of Reformed missions from New
England.  Centralized and consolidated Ottoman control in Syria (except perhaps in
Damascus) was a distant reality, just as Beirut was still a relatively unimportant city.
Jessup himself started as a young seminary graduate with little knowledge of Arabic.
Through Jessup’s fifty-three years with the American mission in Syria, Jessup
experienced and caused many changes that shaped his own writing.  Beirut had not yet
become the intellectual, cosmopolitan, and political center that it would be by the late
1880s.  Just as Jessup and Syria changed and were changed between 1856 and 1910,
Jessup’s rhetoric also changed.
This paper has argued centrally that the 1885 school closings was a watershed in
the history of the American mission to Syria that altered Jessup’s attitude and writing
accordingly.  The Hamidian regime in the 1880s made sweeping changes especially in
the provinces of the Empire.  These reforms were based on Abdul Hamid’s imperial
Ottoman, and necessarily Islamic as this paper has shown, vision for how society should
be ordered in order to consolidate the Empire internally so as to strengthen it externally.
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Henry Jessup became aware of these sweeping changes because of the Ottoman school
closings in 1885.  Up to this point, Jessup’s writing had reflected the reality that most of
the problems for the American mission came from sources other than the Ottomans and
Islam.  After 1885, Jessup began a new rhetorical campaign that accurately described as
well as exaggerated the Ottoman-Islamic reform efforts in Syria in order to gain support
from the Protestant powers and public.  Jessup recognized that the Ottoman efforts
presented a direct threat to the most influential element of the American mission, its
schools.  The nature of education in the American mission schools—as it was designed to
instill Protestant and Western thought—also presented a threat to the Ottoman authorities.
For many reasons including Jessup’s deep personal faith as well as the history of the
American mission in Syria, Jessup responded defensively to the Ottoman efforts to
remove the dangerous Protestant ideology.  While the Ottomans never intended to
enforce closure of all of the American schools in Syria, Jessup worried that Ottoman
efforts would be especially injurious to American missionary efforts in outlying and
confessionally diverse regions of Syria.  Furthermore, Jessup realized that if the
American mission were forced to give into the new Ottoman regulations for education,
the previous leeway and influence of the American mission schools would be greatly
diminished.  Jessup also recognized the increasing presence of Ottoman state education,
or at least Ottoman-influenced education, that would receive many of the students that the
American mission hoped to reach.
In the end, Jessup’s vehement efforts from 1885 into the early 1890s were largely
ineffective in altering the course of Ottoman efforts against American missionary
schools.  The Ottoman efforts at reform that began in the 1880s were practical and done
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in such a way as to not induce a sustained reaction from the Great Powers.  While
American missionary efforts continued to have an important impact especially in the
areas of religious publication and higher education, the mission as a whole grew more
secular and marginal in the 1890s and into the new century.  Henry Jessup, by the time of
his composition of his memoir in the late 1900s, had witnessed the transformation of the
American mission in Syria from a fledgling operation with significant hopes for future
improvement and success into an entrenched institution that held onto its many gains but
did not look forward (correctly) to the type of success that had seemed possible in 1856.
Soon after Jessup’s death, the Ottoman Empire would be ended by World War I, an event
that also caused great destruction to American mission efforts in Syria.  During the
interwar period, the new French mandate government of Syria did not look kindly on the
mission and the Protestant missionary enterprise as a whole entered a new period where
the concept of missions designed to bring religious transformation in the Muslim world
overall would be called into question.
What Jessup had witnessed and fought against in 1885 was in many ways the
beginning of the end for the original hope of the American Board’s mission to Syria: to
reach the people of the Holy Land with the gospel message and in so doing to bring about
transformative change in the society as a whole.  While the educational and civilizational
efforts of the mission would carry on to some degree after the end of the Ottoman
Empire, its original religious goals, that Jessup also held, were successfully checked by
the Hamidian reforms of the 1880s.
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Questions for Further Study
For the purposes of this master’s thesis, there were many interesting elements for
study that arose that could only be mentioned briefly.  Were this thesis to be expanded,
several further perspectives would be added in order to provide a richer account of the
Syria mission.
Conceptions of gender had an important impact on both missionary writing and
practice.  Jessup, for example, especially used his perception of the supposed degrading
Muslim treatment of women as a reason for the inherent illegitimacy and inadequacy of
the religion.  An evaluation of the shaping of the missionaries’ own ideas of gender, in
the midst of the Victorian era ideal of the woman as the moral defender and uplifter of
the home and family, would do much for explaining how he criticized Muslim treatment
of women.  Gender is also significant in the area of education, as Linda Herrera has
pointed out so well.388  Oftentimes, the mission schools are referred to in missionary and
secondary sources (including this paper) simply as schools with students, while actually
what is being referred to are boys’ schools with male students.  Schooling in Syria in the
mid to late nineteenth century was hardly ever coeducational, especially on the lower
levels.389  For both Christian and Muslim schools, there was almost “no formal education
for girls and. . . non-religious books were a luxury.”390  Of course the exact statistics on
this are difficult to ascertain because some schools, such as the primary Muslim schools
were theoretically open to both genders.391  This is certainly a significant question,
because, based on Shahin Makarius’ statistics published in al-Muqtataf in 1883, in 1882
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in Beirut fifty-four percent of the students in Christian schools were female and only
seventeen percent of the students in the Muslim schools were female.392  Certainly, one of
the major impacts of the American mission was its great expansion of female education,
although on a different (more domestically centered including such subjects as sewing
and feminine formation overall) curriculum.  Ellen Fleischmann’s recent study highlights
many of these issues in its evaluation of the Beirut Female Seminary, which went on to
become the first women’s college in the Arab world.393
A more complete study would include a more in-depth study of how concepts of
gender, both masculinity and femininity, were important in the American mission’s
crafting of their program of education, curriculum, and even conception of schools.  For
example, girls’ schools were often run by the wives of the male missionaries who came to
Syria.  Missionaries, who saw the schools for both boys and girls as a means to bring up
polite and cultivated men and women, hoped to impart feminine attitudes (at least as they
saw them) through these female teachers.  Of course, this was also related to local
sensibilities that would not have allowed girls to be away from the company of their
parents unless in the care of a trusted woman.
Furthermore, this also brings up issues concerning missionary conceptions of
marriage.  For example, the American Board, at least for a time, did not allow male
missionaries to go overseas until they were married.394   Nor were women typically
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allowed to go without a spouse.395  At the same time, missionary schools for boys,
including the Syrian Protestant College, hoped to foster masculinity: “the goal was to
create the ideal man and prepare him for daily life.”396  In the overall project to study the
interplay of cultures, civilization, religions, etc. of the missionary enterprise, gender has
been an understudied issue that demands further study for its insight into missionary
attitudes and local reaction.
The second main area where this project would hopefully expand in the future
would be to include much more about the indigenous reaction to the American mission to
Syria and at the same time about the actual impact of the mission.  Dunch’s article points
out quite correctly that there have been many studies concerning missionary attitudes,
perceptions, etc., but that there is a lack of studies that evaluate the actual impact of
missions.  He also argues persuasively that studies about impact are actually more fruitful
and steer the field away from the endless debates of the past concerning the relationship
of missionaries to imperialism.  A study of indigenous reactions also demonstrates the
reality of the agency that the people of Syria certainly had.397  To study only missionary
attitudes is to neglect a crucial element that shaped how missionaries actually did their
work.  This paper has attempted to present as much about impact and indigenous reaction
as possible, mainly based on the excellent work of other scholars, but until the author’s
proficiency in other languages increases, this project must be postponed.
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Another possible area for future study is that of class.  Although Keith
Watenpaugh’s recent book concerning the presence and character of the middle class in
early twentieth century Aleppo only briefly mentions missionary impact, this study
signals an important point of study for future research.398  Did the American missionaries
in Syria in the nineteenth century have any impact on the formation of class-
consciousness, at least in terms of a sort of intellectualized class?  They certainly hoped
to, especially through their educational work, the Syrian Protestant College being the
premier example of this.399  One important part of the American mission to Syria, at least
in the rhetoric of the mission boards and in the writings of some missionaries like Daniel
Bliss, was to create a new class of educated Syrian men and women (especially men) that
would uplift Syria and help place it among the theater of other “civilized” and “modern”
nations.  Butrus al-Bustani, the American mission’s most famous pupil, certainly bought
into this project to some extent, although he also used what he had learned to craft his
own vision of Syria’s future.400
It is also true that many of the alumni of the Syrian Protestant College went onto
fill more service sector (doctors, lawyers, teachers, etc.) jobs than their fellow Syrians,
especially those who were not able to reach the higher levels of other foreign, Islamic, or
Ottoman state schools.401  This question is in some ways related to the larger issue of the
possible relationship of the Syrian patriotism movements of Bustani and other Christian
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Arabs in the late nineteenth century to later Arab nationalist movements.402  In other
words, how much did this class of Syrian men who attended missionary schools have an
effect on larger movements in Syrian history?  Perhaps the later influence of men such as
Michel Aflaq suggests that the answer is at least not insignificant, although due to various
historical factors, in many ways late Ottoman Syria seems to be a historical high point for
Christian Arabs of Syria.
Finally, in the long-term, this project would be improved if it were able to be
performed in a comparative perspective.  The findings of this paper would be enriched by
a comparative look, for example, at American Protestant missionaries in Kurdistan in the
mid-nineteenth century and those in Syria at the same time.  Or even more broadly, a
study comparing and contrasting French Catholic missions in colonial North Africa with
American missions in Ottoman Syria would be both exciting and beneficial.  Dunch calls,
in his 2002 article, ultimately for more comparative studies that shed light on
“globalizing modernity,” and studies such as those just mentioned would fulfill this call
in hopes to emphasize the diversity of the missions enterprise and the complexity of the
relationship between Western Christian missionaries and indigenous societies.
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